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A Dearth of Remedies
Elizabeth D. De Armond*
Federal privacy statutes purport to solidify norms for the privacy of
our personal information, whether financial, medical, or other. They
impose burdens on those who have control over such information.
However, they often fail to offer real remedies when those burdens are
not met. As a consequence, individuals may falsely perceive that the
disclosure of their private data will be punished, while the regulated
receive comfort that they can breach privacy with impunity. This trend
of toothlessness in federal privacy law began with the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, which allows some, but not complete, private remedies,
and has continued through the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act. Most recently, the trend appears in
congressional bills offered to protect the security of personal
information, bills that prohibit private remedies and preempt such
remedies that otherwise exist in state laws.
However, given the importance of privacy norms and the tradition
of rights and remedies for privacy at the state level, states should seek to
push their capacities to use laws, whether common or enacted, to protect
their citizens to the very limits they can. Enforcement of social privacy
* Assistant Professor of Law, Legal Research and Writing, Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
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norms, as embodied in laws state or federal, is necessary to protect
personality and dignity. States can resume their traditional roles as
protectors of their citizens by responding to increased threats to privacy
through adapting common law torts or by enacting legislation; where
these instruments provide enforcement through private causes of action,
those protected by the instruments can vindicate their rights. More
importantly, such remedies can deter violations to begin with, the
ultimate aim of any privacy provision.
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INTRODUCTION
If a privacy right is violated, but a federal law denies the injured any
remedy, has privacy been protected? Congress's interest in privacy
issues has grown over the last four decades, but effective protection has
shrunk. The federal government has started to regulate commercial
entities' use of personal information by enacting its own statutory
schemes in the area, which had previously been the province of state law.
Key among these federal enactments are the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act. These federal statutes appear to protect privacy by
setting standards that restrict others' use of personal information.
Nonetheless, these statutes fail to fulfill their promise of privacy.
Traditionally, tort law has protected individuals from the wrongful
acts of others.' Traditionally states, rather than the federal government,
have adopted and developed torts and administered their remedies.
Where needed to protect consumers, states have enacted legislation to
augment traditional torts. While in theory no harm arises from the
federal government joining the states in the business of privacy
protection, federal statutes have been miserly with remedies, often
providing individuals with no ability to enforce privacy provisions. In
some cases, federal privacy law provisions wholly preempt state laws
that would otherwise provide injured plaintiffs with a remedy,
foreclosing the possibility of any meaningful relief for those invasions of
privacy that the enactment prohibits.
Federal privacy legislation may also generate publicity that may
distract individuals from the lack of enforcement power, leading them to
believe they have more solid protection than in fact the federal statutes
provide. This could in turn lead individuals to fail to take their own steps
to protect themselves, acting under the false impression that the laws will
encourage those regulated by them to comply with the laws' restrictions.
Congress is now threatening to continue this trend in its
consideration of a national personal information security law.2 This
legislation would require those who possess sensitive consumer
information to alert consumers when they learn that someone has broken
through security to filch the information. The majority of states have
already passed legislation that addresses this need, a need driven by
advancements in database technology and the related rise of identity
theft. Furthermore, several of the states that have passed such legislation
1. T. COOLEY, LAWOFTORTS 2-3 (1880).
2. See note 92, infra.
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provide private remedies to those whose information has been put at risk.
Nonetheless, bills pending in Congress would not only bar private
remedies, but would preempt state laws that provide such remedies. In
effect, such a bill would eliminate those privacy protections from the
state domain, effectively bar any injured individual from obtaining
redress, and relieve business entities from the risks of treating personal
information carelessly.
By eliminating remedies, these measures of the federal government
collectively indicate a trend of reducing, rather than expanding, privacy
rights, a trend obscured by the activity of legislating privacy "rights."
When federal measures effectively reverse states' efforts to protect the
privacy of their citizens without providing any substitute remedies,
federal legislation that superficially purports to protect privacy may
actually diminish it.
I. A MODERN TREND OF REMEDILESS FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
Privacy of personal information has drawn the attention of Congress
over the last few decades. Discussed below are congressional civil acts
that regulate the disclosure of information collected by non-
governmental entities. Laws directed only at the collection and
disclosure of individual information by governmental entities, such as the
Privacy Act 4 and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 are excluded. The
acts described have in common standards for privacy of personal
information, but one or more handicaps in enforcement. These
handicaps can undermine the desired goal of privacy laws, which is to
deter breaches of privacy. Once privacy is breached, it cannot be
restored, particularly in the digital age, where items of information can
become immortal: genies un-bottled. Thus, to meaningfully protect
privacy, laws should inhibit the initial invasion of privacy. A significant
means of doing so is to put in place remedies that will motivate actors to
respect the privacy of those for whom the laws exist.
3. See text accompanying notes 91-95, infra.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
5. Id. § 552.
2008]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
A. Privacy Laws with Curtailed Remedies
1. The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Recent Amendments
a. The Original Act
Individuals' transactions with third parties are of intense interest to
lenders, businesses, employers, insurers, and marketers, among others.
This thirst for information, along with accelerating developments in
database technology, led consumer reporting agencies to amass huge
amounts of data about Americans' personal financial matters, including
their loans, bills, insurance, and employment. Alarmed by increased
access to personal information, Congress passed the original Fair Credit
Reporting Act (the "FCRA" or "Act") in 1970, in part to protect the
privacy of consumers' transaction data.6
Congress understood how the computerization of personal
information estranged individuals from their personal information,
leading to a loss of control over data. Congress sought to protect
personal privacy by restricting those who could access a particular
individual's financial information from a consumer reporting agency.
8
To gain such access, an agency's subscriber, the user of the credit report,
has to certify to the agency that it has a "permissible purpose" for
acquiring the information. 9  For the most part, the FCRA limits
permissible purposes to specified needs for credit, employment, and
insurance investigations. 10  Those who merely want to be nosey and
delve through an individual's financial information are not legally able to
obtain it from consumer reporting agencies. For example, the Act does
not permit one who simply seeks information in connection with a
lawsuit against another to obtain such information.1' Furthermore, an
agency may not reveal one's financial history to a party who takes an
interest in the information in order to make a decision about someone
else, because the Act forbids a user from obtaining a consumer report on
6. See Pub. L. No. 91-508 (Oct. 26, 1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1681x (2006)).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 168 1b(a).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(f), 1681e.
10. Id. § 168 1b(a)(3). Governmental entities, such as child support agencies, courts,
and certain regulatory agencies may also obtain consumer reports in certain
circumstances. See id. §§ 1681b(a)(1), 1681b(a)(4), 1681b(a)(5), 1681b(a)(6).
11. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 1998); Duncan v.
Handmaker, 149 F.3d 424, 426-28 (6th Cir. 1998).
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one person in order to judge another.12 For example, an employer trying
to decide whether to hire a man may not pull the credit file of the man's
wife, regardless of how relevant that user thinks the history is to the
hiring decision.
The Act also protects privacy by drawing a curtain on the earlier
stages of one's transactional life. Agencies must exclude stale, obsolete
information from a report on an individual. 13  For example, most
information that is more than seven years old falls outside the boundaries
for permissible report content.
14
In addition, the Act protects privacy by prohibiting agencies from
circulating damaging falsehoods about individuals to others. It does so
by requiring agencies to use "reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy" of the information they put into individuals' reports.
15
Furthermore, once agencies learn that their files may contain inaccurate
information, they must recheck the information by asking the original
furnisher to verify it. 16
All of these are valuable provisions that enhance personal privacy.
However, although the Act was a significant step forward in federalizing
privacy rights for individuals' financial information, it came at a great
cost to other potential sources of privacy protection. First, the Act
specifically immunizes information furnishers, users, and consumer
reporting agencies from state tort suits "in the nature of defamation,
invasion of privacy, or negligence" where the suits are based on
information disclosed by such party pursuant to the Act. 17 Thus, the Act
significantly undercuts a state's ability to use the threat of tort liability to
discourage these parties from invading an individual's privacy, even
though the FCRA may specifically prohibit the very behavior at issue.
This immunity arose as a quidpro quo for the right of consumers to view
their own information that the consumer reporting agencies had collected
about them.' 8 To override the immunity, a consumer must show that the
party acted either willfully or with actual malice;' 9 this New York Times
12. See Zamora v. Valley Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 811 F.2d 1368, 1370 (10th
Cir. 1987).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c.
14. Id. § 1681c(a). The Act exempts some categories of information from the
obsolescence rule. Id. § 1681c(b).
15. Id. § 1681e(b).
16. Id. § 1681i.
17. Id. § 1681h(e).
18. 115 CONG. REC. 33411 (1969) ("That is the quid pro quo.").
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
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v. Sullivan level of malfeasance has been difficult for ordinary
consumers to meet.20
The loss of state tort actions would be trivial if the federal act itself
supplied sufficient remedies for infractions of privacy and effectively
substituted for the lost tort remedies. Congress could have compensated
for the FCRA's shield of state tort immunity for FCRA-prohibited acts
by offering comparable remedies under the FCRA. Instead, though the
FCRA has two civil liability provisions, as enacted these remedies
provide an unsatisfactory substitute for state tort remedies. First, as a
general rule, where an agency or user negligently breaches the Act, the
injured party may sue for actual damages. 2' However, only those
damages that the injured can show arose directly from the defendant's
violation of the specified FCRA standard are eligible for compensation.22
Injury from a disclosure permitted by the Act that may nonetheless create
an actionable wrong under state tort law will fall outside the permitted
compensation, but may fall inside the Act's immunity provision,
protecting the wrongdoer from state law damages.23 The Act also allows
an individual who cannot demonstrate compensable injuries to recover
nominal statutory damages, capped at $1,000, though only where the
individual can show that the agency "willfully" violated the Act.24
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See, e.g., Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 457 F.3d
460, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant, a consumer
reporting agency, on the plaintiffs libel claim); Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d
359, 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating a judgment for the plaintiff on his defamation claim);
Rhodes v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 951 F.2d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary
judgment for the defendant, a furnisher, on the plaintiffs defamation and negligence
claims); Thurman v. Case Credit Corp., No. 1:04CV00003LMB, 2005 WL 3074149, at
*6 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2005) (granting summary judgment to the defendant, a furnisher,
on the plaintiff's defamation claim); Gohman v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 395 F.
Supp. 2d 822, 829 (D. Minn. 2005) (granting summary judgment to the defendant, a
consumer reporting agency, on the plaintiffs claims for credit defamation and tortious
interference with credit expectancy); Anderson v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 345 F. Supp. 2d
963, 973-74 (D. Wis. 2004) (granting summary judgment to one of the defendants, a
consumer reporting agency, on the plaintiff's claims for credit defamation and tortious
interference with credit expectancy).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2006). One scholar has proposed that a strict liability
standard for FCRA violations would reallocate losses caused by identity theft from
victims to furnishers and consumer reporting agencies, thereby providing them with a
greater incentive to prevent such theft. See Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls:
Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U. PiTr. L. KEv. 343, 391-93
(2003).
22. Id. § 1681o.
23. Id. § 1681h(e).
24. Id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has recently ruled that a defendant's
reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights under the Act can satisfy this standard,
rejecting the argument that the plaintiff must prove intent. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Burr, _-U.S. __ 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2209-10 (2007). Punitive damages are also
[Vol. 113:1
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The second provision permits an individual to seek punitive
damages, a remedy characteristic of traditional tort law, but again, only
where the plaintiff can show willfulness. 25  However, as with the
immunity provision mentioned above, willfulness has proven to be a
difficult standard for individuals to meet.26 Thus, while providing some
opportunity for relief, the FCRA's original provisions actually narrowed,
rather than expanded or even equaled, the scope of potential liability for
breaching an individual's privacy.27 The Act's civil liability provisions
do not adequately replace the torts from which it immunizes wrongdoers.
b. The 1996 Amendments
The FCRA, as originally passed, provides wrongdoers with
immunity, albeit qualified, from state torts and limits their exposure to
punitive damages. Congress has retained this immunity through various
revisions of the Act and, in 1996, expanded the pool of those who could
claim the benefits of the immunity provision's shield. Among the actors
that may claim the protections of this provision are those who furnish
information about individuals and their transactions to consumer
reporting agencies. Typically, these are parties with which an individual
dealt with directly, perhaps without realizing that the information given
might someday make it to a wider audience.
Originally, the FCRA did little to control furnishers of information.
Furnishers are the banks, credit card issuers, utilities, insurers and others
that give personal information about their customers to consumer
reporting agencies, to be pooled with information from other furnishers
and then delivered to those who request reports about those customers.
permitted where a user obtains a consumer report under false pretenses or knowingly
without a permissible purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1n(b).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 168In(a)(2).
26. See, e.g., Casella v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 56 F.3d 469, 486 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming summary judgment for the defendant, a consumer reporting agency, reasoning
that the plaintiff had failed to show sufficient evidence that the agency's failure to delete
inaccurate information was willful), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1150 (1996); Stevenson v.
TRW, Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that the trial court's finding of
willfulness was clearly erroneous); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir.
1986) (vacating a jury's award of punitive damages against a consumer reporting
agency). The Eighth Circuit requires "knowing and intentional commission of an act the
defendant knows to violate the law." Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 370 (8th Cir.
2002).
27. Generally, an action for invasion of privacy can yield damages both for
monetary harm and mental distress, including "emotional distress or personal
humiliation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H, 652H cmt. b (1979). Some
jurisdictions permit additional damages. See, e.g., Shahi v. Madden, 949 A.2d 1022,
1034-35 (Vt. 2008) (affirming punitive damages award of $1,000,000 on invasion of
privacy claim); Pearson v. Kancilia, 70 P.3d 594, 599 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
punitive damage award of $200,000 on intrusion upon seclusion claim).
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However, in 1996, Congress extended the Act to impose responsibilities
on those who furnish individuals' financial transaction information to
agencies.28 On their face, the 1996 provisions appeared to significantly
advance the interests of individuals by requiring furnishers to refrain
from knowingly reporting false information, and to correct and update
information, among other duties of care.29 In theory, this provision could
curb furnishers who might damage consumers' financial reputations by
carelessly reporting false information about their transactions. These
provisions could have significantly enhanced privacy by imposing, for
the first time, a federal duty of care in the disclosure of personal
transaction information to consumer reporting agencies.
Congress, however, retained the Act's qualified immunity provision
for furnishers and expanded the provision's reach, immunizing furnishers
from state actions for invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligence
that an individual could have otherwise pursued under state common or
statutory law.30  Had Congress not done so, the standards set by the
provisions could have had meaning in a state action. For example, an
FCRA provision could have served as the statutory standard in a
negligence per se action. 3' Thus, what appeared to advance the privacy
rights of individuals by federalizing obligations of furnishers actually
curtailed the ability of individuals to protect themselves.
Congress went even further in favor of furnishers. Though
individuals may still usually pursue consumer reporting agencies through
the Act itself when such agencies violate their obligations, Congress
specifically shielded furnishers from the risk of liability under the Act for
some of the most egregious violations of their new obligations. It
provided that the Act's civil liability provisions did not apply to
violations of all but one of the new duties.32 Perhaps the most important
of the new duties, that prohibiting furnishers from providing information
that the furnisher knew or should have known to be false,33 cannot be the
subject of a private cause of action. Accordingly, an individual who has
been injured by a furnisher's breach of these new responsibilities under
28. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2413 (Sept. 30, 1996).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) (2007).
30. Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2408(e)(4).
31. See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed Final Draft 2006); see also Moody v.
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 57 Fed. Appx. 211, 2003 WL 147741, at *1 (5th Cir.
2003) (ruling that the FCRA's qualified immunity provision applied to a negligence per
se action based on the defendant's alleged breach of the Act's standards); Vincent R.
Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV.
255, 264 (2005) (discussing how state information security statutes may give rise to a
cause of action even though they do not expressly create such a cause of action).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c).
33. Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1).
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the Act would, in most cases, have to hope that the designated federal or
state authorities would come to the individual's defense and bring suit
against the violating furnisher on the individual's behalf.3 4  The
individual could not, on his or her own, seek compensation for the
misuse of personal information. The sole duty left open for private
remedies is that requiring a furnisher to reinvestigate the accuracy of an
item that a consumer has disputed, and this duty only arises when the
furnisher has received notice of the dispute from a consumer reporting
agency.35
That Congress eliminated any liability under the Act for many
furnisher violations alone would have disarmed individuals who suffered
violations of the Act. However, Congress was not satisfied that the
qualified immunity provision that protected those regulated by the Act
from tort liability, along with the elimination of a private remedy through
the Act, would sufficiently shield feckless furnishers from having to
compensate anyone for their wrongdoing. Accordingly, Congress
specifically preempted states from protecting their consumers from
privacy invasions that pertained in any way to the subject matter of the
new federal protections from furnishers.36 By doing so, Congress
hamstrung the ability of states to protect consumers from furnishers who
provide false, inaccurate, or obsolete information to agencies, and also
severely impaired the abilities of consumers to enforce the substance of
the new obligations.
Effectively, then, most of the newly enacted rights existed on paper
only, and states lost a great deal of power. The lesson for furnishers of
information was that they could breach the Act's privacy standards with
impunity. Accordingly, what appeared to be new privacy rights turned
out to be a muted license to traffic in personal information. This
preemption, however, was not intended to be permanent. The crippling
of state authority was originally due to expire January 1, 2004."7
c. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
Congress rolled back individual privacy remedies even further in
2003, when it passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
("FACTA"), amending the FCRA. FACTA stripped some existing
claims, expanded the list of provisions for which no private claims may
34. See id. § 1681s (identifying governmental authorities authorized to enforce the
Act).
35. Id. §§ 1681s-2(b), 1681s-2(c)(1).
36. Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 2413, 2419 (Sept. 30, 1996) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1681t).
37. Id. § 2419.
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be brought, and both expanded and solidified the FCRA's preemption of
state laws.38
Until that time, some significant privacy protections that consumers
could claim were the Act's requirements of users that take action based
on information in a consumer report. The FCRA requires a user that
takes an action adverse to a consumer to notify the consumer that the
action was based at least in part on a consumer report and to identify the
agency that issued the report.39 A user has to provide a consumer with
this adverse action notice whenever information in a consumer's report
led the user, for example, to deny or revoke credit or insurance, or raise
charges or premiums, or fire or refuse to hire someone.4° In addition, the
FCRA requires creditors to notify their customers when they deny or
increase a credit charge based on information that they receive from a
source other than a consumer reporting agency.41 These rights enhance
individuals' privacy by alerting them to the use of their private financial
information and by warning them that negative information about them is
not only held in the hands of a consumer reporting agency or another, but
is being disclosed to third parties as well.
From the FCRA's inception, consumers could enforce these
protections through a private action under the Act. 42  However, in a
stunning strike against individual privacy, Congress eliminated the
decades-old enforcement right by prohibiting nearly all causes of action
by consumers against users of consumer reports who violate the Act's
requirements.43
38. Pub. L. No. 108-159 (Dec. 4, 2003).
39, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a).
40. Id. §§ 1681a(k), 1681d(a)(6).
41. Id. § 168 1m(b). This notice requirement applies to denials of credit for personal,
family, or household purposes where the information bears on the consumer's
creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living, but does not apply to denials of insurance or
employment. Id.
42. Id. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
43. Id. § 1681m(h)(8); see also Bonner v. CorTrust Bank, N.A., No. 2:05-CV-137
PS, 2006 WL 1980183, at **34 (N.D. Ind. July 12, 2006); Miller v. CoreStar Fin. Group
of Pa., Inc., No. 05-5133, 2006 WL 1876584, at **2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2006);
Crowder v. PMI Mortg. Ins. Co., No. 2:06CVOI 14-VPM, 2006 WL 1528608, at *4
(M.D. Ala. May 26, 2006) (rejecting argument that section 168 m(h)(8) should not be
applied retroactively); Bonner v. Home123 Corp., No. 2:05-CV-146 PS, 2006 WL
1518974, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 25, 2006); Bruce v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2006 WL
1195210, at *2 (N.D. May 2, 2006); Bruce v. Grieger's Motor Sales, Inc., 422 F. Supp.
2d 988, 991 (N.D. Ind. 2006); Putkowski v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., No. C 05-3289
PJH, 2006 WL 741387, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2006); Bonner v. H & R Block Mortg.
Corp., No. 2:05-CV-162, 2006 WL 760258, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2006); Phillips v.
New Century Fin. Corp., No. SACV050692DOCRNBX, 2006 WL 517653, at **2.4
(C.D. Cal., Mar. 1, 2006); Harris v. Fletcher Chrysler Prods., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-1 140-
LJM-VSS, 2006 WL 279030, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2006); White v. E-Loan, Inc., 409
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Congress not only eliminated the cause of action, but it
simultaneously retained the explicit preemption of state laws that could
protect consumers from over-aggressive users." In fact, Congress made
permanent all of the preemption provisions of the 1996 legislation that
were originally intended to be temporary, and were due to sunset the first
day of 2004.45 That the limitations on the ability of states to regulate
furnishers of information were about to sunset led to widespread panic
among industry participants who traffic in consumers' personal
information and was a major impetus for the 2003 legislation.46 To
satisfy these participants, Congress solidified the preexisting preemption
provisions and added a batch of additional preemption provisions, further
weakening the states' ability to offer the remedies to consumers that
Congress had denied to them.4 7 Industry participants have since
F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1184-87 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Killingsworth v. Household Bank (SB),
N.A., No. 05 C 5729, 2006 WL 250704, at *3 (N.D. 111. Jan. 31, 2006); Stavroff v.
Gurley Leep Dodge, Inc., No. 3:05 CV 229, 2006 WL 196381, at **2-5 (N.D. Ind. Jan.
20, 2006); Villagran v. Freeway Ford, Ltd., No. Civ.A. H-05-2687, 2006 WL 964731, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2006); Murray v. Cross Country Bank, 399 F. Supp. 2d 843, 844
(N.D. 111. 2005); Murray v. Household Bank (SB), N.A., 386 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997-99
(N.D. Ill. 2005); Hernandez v. Citifinancial Servs., Inc., No. 05 C 2263, 2005 WL
3430858, at *6 (N.D. 111. Dec. 9, 2005); McCane v. America's Credit Jewelers, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 05 C 5089, 2005 WL 3299371, at *3 (N.D. I11. Dec. 1, 2005); Phillips v. New
Century Fin. Corp., No. SACV05-0692DOC(RNBX), 2005 WL 3828735, at *5, (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 9, 2005); Pietras v. Curfin Oldsmobile, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05 C 4624, 2005 WL
2897386, at * 4 (N.D. I11. Nov. 1, 2005). But see Barnette v. Brook Road, Inc., 429 F.
Supp. 2d 741, 749 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that amendment did not eliminate private
cause of action for all subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1681m).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(C) (preempting as to § 1681m(a) and (b), relating to
users' adverse actions against individuals); id. § 1681t(b)(l)(D) (preempting as to
§ 168 l m(d), relating to users' use of consumer reports in connection with making a firm
offer of credit or insurance); id. § 1681 t(b)(1)(1) (preempting as to § 1681 m(h), relating to
the use of credit reports in risk-based-pricing); id. § 1681t(b)(5)(F) (preempting as to
§§ 1681m(e), (f), and (g), measures concerning identity theft).
45. Id. § 1681t(d).
46. Id. § 168 It(d). See EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES & CREDIT REPORTS: How
THE SYSTEM REALLY WORKS, WHAT YOU CAN Do 337-65 (2d ed. 2005) (describing the
behind-the-scenes activities leading up to the passage of FACTA).
47. Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 151(a)(2) (preempting state laws relating to certain
information to be made available to identity theft victims); Pub. L. No. 108-159,
§ 214(c)(2) (preempting state laws relating to the sharing of information by affiliates for
marketing purposes); Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 212(e) (preempting state law with respect to
designated disclosures agencies are to make); Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 311 (b) (preempting
state laws with respect to risk-based credit pricing notices); Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 711
(preempting state laws with respect to requirements for the truncation of credit card and
debit card numbers, identity theft fraud alerts, blocking of information resulting from
identity theft, social security number digit exclusion from credit reports, free annual
credit reports, red flag guidelines, prohibition on sale or transfer of debt caused by
identity theft, debt collector communications concerning identity theft, coordination of
consumer complaint investigations among agencies, duties of furnishers upon notice of
identity theft-related information, and disposal of records).
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effectively used the provisions to invalidate state efforts to address
information privacy concerns.48
In sum, the FCRA establishes federal standards to limit the use and
disclosure of certain personal information related to individuals'
financial transactions. However, Congress has increasingly weakened
the ability of consumers to enforce these protections, whether at the
federal or the state level. The original Act granted regulated parties a
generous shield from state tort actions and limited remedies for
violations. Later, Congress added to the Act requirements for furnishers,
but protected such data disclosers from the private enforcement
mechanisms that Congress incorporated into the Act, and temporarily
preempted state laws regulating much of the subject matter of the 1996
additions. In 2003, Congress via FACTA solidified preemption
provisions that were intended to be temporary, added new provisions that
similarly quelled state law, and eliminated wholesale any private cause
of action for a whole category of provisions that consumers had been
able to enforce since the Act's inception.
2. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Other federal enactments have followed up on the FCRA's model,
providing the appearance of new privacy rights with the actuality of
reduced privacy remedies. Both the FCRA, discussed above, and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, discussed below, pertain to the privacy of
individuals' financial information. Such information is sensitive because
it has the power to make people feel vulnerable to the judgments of those
who learn of it. Medical information, however, is also quite sensitive,
and one of the most visible actions of Congress in protecting (or
appearing to protect) consumers' privacy is the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA" or the "Act"), passed in
1996.49 Pursuant to that Act, the Department of Health and Human
Services promulgated privacy regulations that implement the Act's
privacy provisions, collectively known as the "Privacy Rule," which
48. See, e.g., American Bankers Ass'n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that the FCRA's preemption of state law with respect to its provision that
allows affiliates to share consumers' financial information invalidated aspects of
California's sweeping financial information privacy statute); Consumer Data Industry
Ass'n v. Swanson, No. 07-CV-3376, 2007 WL 2219389, at *5 (D. Minn. July 30, 2007)
(relying on FCRA's preemption provision to enjoin the state's attorney general from
enforcing a newly enacted provision, Minn. Stat. § 13C.01 (2008), that prohibited
consumer reporting agencies from generating lists of consumers who have applied for
mortgages, known as "mortgage trigger lists," and marketing them to third parties).
49. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of titles 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the United*States Code).
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apply to "covered entities. '5 °  The Privacy Rule prohibits covered
entities, which include hospitals, insurers, and other participants in the
medical industry, from using or disclosing protected health information,
unless the use or disclosure is specifically permitted.5' In promulgating
the Privacy Rule, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
emphasized the importance of privacy as "a fundamental right [that]
must be viewed differently than any ordinary economic good.,
52
HIPAA received a great deal of publicity when the Privacy Rule
went into effect, coverage that emphasized the Rule's provisions
governing the disclosure of health records.53 However, that coverage did
not completely accord with reality. HIPAA primarily demands notices,
rather than restricts disclosures. The Privacy Rule provides that a
consumer "has a right to adequate notice of the uses and disclosures of
protected health information that may be made by the covered entity, and
of the individual's rights and the covered entity's legal duties with
respect to protected health information., 54  The Rule does require an
entity to seek a consumer's consent before disclosing information for
marketing procedures. 5 Psychotherapy notes, perhaps the information
with the most potential to humiliate, also receive special protections.56
Despite the stated purpose, however, the Rule provides entities with wide
latitude to use and disclose medical information to carry out treatment
and health care operations.57 In addition, and perhaps less justifiably,
covered entities may disclose medical information, no matter how
personal and individually attributable to a specific patient, in order to
obtain payment. 58 As such, these exceptions to HIPAA weaken the
purported protections.
More disturbingly, regardless of how much or how little HIPAA
limits the wanton use of private medical information, covered entities
50. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,461-82,510 (Dec. 28, 2000).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a).
52. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,464-82,465 (Dec. 28, 2000), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/. The Secretary also acknowledged that state tort law is a
primary protector of privacy interests. Id. at 82464.
53. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Privacy, Please; New Rules May Protect
Patients, Alter Hospital, Office Practices, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2003, at F01; Martin
Miller, A Tougher Medical Privacy Law; Health Care Providers Are Hurrying to Comply
With a Federal Law that Aims to Further Limit the Spread of Patient Information, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at part 6, 1; Robert Pear, Health System Warily Prepares for New
Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at Al.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520.
55. Id. § 164.508(a)(3)(i).
56. Id. § 164.508(a)(2)(i).
57. Id. § 164.506(c)(1).
58. Id.
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remain free from fear that any individual injured by a violation of
HIPAA will be able to enforce any rights under the Act. HIPAA
provides for administrative enforcement, but does not specifically
provide that injured individuals may sue to recover for violations. Every
court to examine the issue has held that Congress did not intend to allow
individuals to enforce their rights under the Act, but rather intended only
that administrative agencies be permitted to enforce the law.59 The
tepidity of such enforcement is described later on in this article.
60
However, in contrast to the FCRA, with its multiple preemption
provisions, 61 HIPAA does not throw states out of the privacy protection
arena. In fact, state law controls where it provides more stringent
protection for individually identifiable health information.
62
3. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
After HIPAA, Title V of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
("GLB" or the "Act") became the next significant consumer privacy
legislation that Congress passed.63 Provisions in GLB appear to protect
privacy by restricting financial institutions' use of certain consumer
59. Courts have consistently ruled that HIPAA does not provide for an implied
private cause of action. See, e.g., Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006);
Cain v. Mitchell, No. 06-00897-CV-W-FJG, 2007 WL 4287866, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 6,
2007); Fast v. Fast, No. 8:07CV310, 2007 WL 2417384, at *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 23, 2007);
Valentin Munoz v. Island Fin. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136 (D.P.R. 2005); Johnson v.
Parker Hughes Clinics, No. Civ.04-4130 PAM/RLE, 2005 WL 102968, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 13, 2005); Univ. of Colo. Hosp. v. Denver Publ'g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1144-
45 (D. Colo. 2004); Logan v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, No. 02-701 (RJL), 2004 WL
3168183, at *4 (D.D.C. July 28, 2004); Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S.
Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 2002);
O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (D. Wyo.
2001).
60. See text accompanying notes 136 to 143, infra.
61. See text accompanying notes 45 to 48, supra.
62. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2006). The regulation identifies other exceptions to
preemption as well. Id. For an analysis of the execution of the preemption provision, see
Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA Privacy Rule with State Laws Regulating Ex
Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs' Treating Physicians: A Guide to Performing HIPAA
Preemption Analysis, 43 HOus. L. REV. 1091 (2006). For a critique of these preemption
provisions, see Grace Ko, Comment, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497 (2006). State law is defined
broadly to mean "a constitution, statute, regulation, rule, common law, or other State
action having the force and effect of law." 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
63. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809
(2006)). The Act is also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. In
addition, the Act prohibits third parties from obtaining protected information through
false pretenses. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6821-27 (2006).
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information.64 Specifically, the Act regulates the use of "nonpublic
personal information," defined as any personally identifiable financial
information that the consumer provides to the institution, that results
from any transaction with the consumer or service the institution
performs for the consumer, or that the institution otherwise obtains.
65
The Federal Trade Commission issued its Financial Privacy Rule to
implement certain details of GLB; 66 this Rule is distinct from HIPAA's
Privacy Rule.67 The Rule provides examples of personally identifiable
financial information that include the simple fact that an individual was a
customer, account balance information, and data that an individual
provides on an account application. 68  The definition specifically
excludes any "publicly available information" from the protected class of
information.69
As a general matter, GLB promotes privacy by prohibiting a
financial institution from disclosing nonpublic personal information
about a consumer to a third party unless the institution has provided the
64. The Act defines "financial institution" to include any institution the business of
which is engaging in financial activities as described in § 1843(k) of Title 12. 15 U.S.C.
§ 6809(3).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4). The FTC's definition of "personally identifiable
financial information" has been upheld against a challenge that the FTC exceeded its
authority in defining the term. See Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42, 50-51 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). GLB also requires agencies subject to the Act to establish standards "relating
to administrative, technical and physical safeguards" to ensure the security of records. 15
U.S.C. § 6801(b). To implement this provision, the FTC issued the "Safeguards Rule,"
which requires financial institutions within the FTC's jurisdiction to develop and
maintain an information security program that contains certain designated elements. 16
C.F.R. pt. 313 (2006). The other agencies subject to GLB issued similar rules. 12 C.F.R.
§ 30 Appx. B (Office of The Comptroller of the Currency) (2005); id. § 208 Appendix D-
2 (Federal Reserve); id. § 364 Appx. B (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id.
§ 570 Appx. B (Office of Thrift Supervision); id. § 748 Appx. A (National Credit Union
Administration).
66. See 16 C.F.R. pt. 313. In addition to the Federal Trade Commission, GLB
specifically grants enforcement authority to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Directors
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Board of the National Credit Union Administration, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and state insurance authorities. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6805(a)(1)(A)-
(D), 6805(a)(2)-(6). The Comptroller of the Currency's regulations are codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 40; the Board of Governors' at 12 C.F.R. pt. 216; the FDIC's at 12 C.F.R. pt.
332; the Office of Thrift Supervision's at 12 C.F.R. pt. 573; the NCUA's at 12 C.F.R. pt.
716; and the SEC's at 12 C.F.R. pt. 248.
67. See text accompanying notes 50 to 52, supra.
68. See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o)(2)(i).
69. The Federal Trade Commission has defined "publicly available information" to
be "any information that you have a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made
available to the general public from: (i) Federal, State, or local government records;
(ii) Widely distributed media; or (iii) Disclosures to the general public that are required to
be made by Federal, State, or local law. " Id. § 313.3(p)(1).
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consumer with an initial privacy notice, has notified the consumer of the
right to opt out of the disclosure, and has given the consumer a
reasonable opportunity to opt out.70 The institution must then await the
consumer's compliance with the institution's procedures for opting out.71
However, should the consumer not take that step, or fail to follow the
opt-out instructions precisely, the institution then becomes free to use the
consumer's information.7
Thus, GLB does not directly prohibit financial institutions from
sharing customer information. Rather, the Act merely requires
institutions to provide certain notices to consumers, including a notice of
the consumer's right to opt out of some disclosures of personal
information.73 Once a consumer has passed on the opportunity to opt
out, the institution may freely share that consumer's information with
whomever it chooses, 74 a feature that led one California legislator to
describe GLB as "a fig leaf., 75 In contrast, at common law one who
discloses private information may be liable under the tort of public
disclosure of private facts.76 The tort does not require the injured
individual to have first notified the tortfeasor that he or she did not want
the information shared.77
The opt-out requirement significantly weakens the impact of GLB's
privacy provisions. In addition, Congress incorporated a slew of exempt
disclosures that also undermine the impact of the Act.78 The most
significant among the exempt disclosures are those made between
affiliates; disclosures to an institution's own affiliates are completely
unrestricted by GLB and its Financial Privacy Rule.79
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1); see also 16 C.F.R. § 313.10(a)(1).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1); see also 16 C.F.R. § 313.10(a)(1).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a).
73. See id. §§ 6802, 6803.
74. The Act does restrict the sharing of one particularly sensitive category of
information regardless of the consumer's opt out: account numbers and similar forms of
access codes. However, even that prohibition is subject to exceptions. See id. § 6892(d);
see also 16 C.F.R. § 313.12.
75. Jennifer 8. Lee, California Law Provides More Financial Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2003, at Al (quoting Jackie Speir, a main sponsor of a California financial
privacy act).
76. See W.P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 856-57 (5th ed.
1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1979); text accompanying
notes 209 to 211, infra.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(1) (listing exempt disclosures); see also 16 C.F.R.
§§ 313.4(a), 313.14-16'(same).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802. The Act and the Financial Privacy Rule merely require
that the institution's privacy notice disclose its policy with respect to disclosing
nonpublic personal information to affiliates. See id. at § 6802(a)(1); see also 16 C.F.R.
§ 313.6.
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While the privacy protections of GLB are weak, the opportunities
for enforcing those protections are even weaker. The Act did not
specifically provide any mechanism by which a consumer could sue to
enforce its provisions.8" Accordingly, every court to address the issue
has dismissed individuals' suits brought pursuant to the Act, holding that
Congress did not intend to provide individuals with any kind of remedy
for the breaches of privacy prohibited by the Act.81
Instead of allowing people to enforce these federal privacy rights,
the Act left them open to only administrative enforcement.82 However,
these agencies have not assertively pursued enforcement; therefore, the
Act's privacy protections are largely ornamental.83 To Congress's credit,
however, in contrast to the sweeping preemption provisions of the
FCRA, GLB does not preempt states from enacting their own privacy
protections in this area,84 and in this way has done less damage than the
FCRA to individuals' ability to protect their privacy in state court.
Accordingly, some states have themselves enacted remedies for those
injured by behavior that violates GLB. 5
4. Proposed Personal Information Security Legislation
Actions in the new area of data security typify the philosophical gap
between state and federal measures on matters of privacy. Recently,
states have led the way in creating legislation to guard against the
damage caused when the security of computerized information is
breached. 86 California's breach statute serves as a model; 87 it provides
80. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6810.
81. See, e.g., Farley v. Williams, No. 02-CV-0667C(SR), 2005 WL 3579060, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005); Borinski v. Williamson, No. Civ.A. 3:02-CV-1014-, 2004
WL 433746, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2004) (no private cause of action under GLB);
Lacerte Software Corp. v. Prof I Tax Servs., L.L.C., No. Civ.3:03-CV-1551-H, 2004 WL
180321, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2004) (same); Menton v. Experian Corp., No. 02 Civ.
4687(NRB), 2003 WL 21692820, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003) (same); see also
Dunmire v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 475 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that no
private cause of action exists under GLB).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 6805.
83. See text accompanying notes 153 to 156, infra.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 6807(a). In fact, the statute explicitly provides that a more
protective state law will not be preempted, so long as it does not conflict with the federal
provision. Id. § 6807(b).
85. See, e.g. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 20-2121 (2001) (governmental enforcement); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West 2006) (relating to security breaches); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 505.8 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404 (West 2004) (private enforcement
through state Deceptive Trade Practices Act); 9-B ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 241 (West
1997) (same).
86. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-7501; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2007);
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 to 530/20. For a complete list, see National Conference of
State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/
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that any business doing business in California must disclose the breach
of security of computerized data that includes personal information
88
The statute specifically authorizes private civil actions to enforce its
security standards. 89 Following California's example, several states have
provided that those whose personal information has been put at risk of
disclosure in violation of a personal information security statute can
bring a suit for damages. 90 State attorneys general, pursuant to state
consumer fraud statutes, have also pursued institutions that have put
individuals' data at risk.91
programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm. See also National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2006 Breach of Information Legislation, www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/
priv/breach.htm. For a discussion of the potential impact of federal preemption on such
laws, see Katherine E. Picanso, Comment, Protecting Information Security Under a
Uniform Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (2006).
87. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2008).
88. See id. § 1798.82(a).
89. See id. § 1798.84(b).
90. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-3(b) (2007) (imposing liability to injured
parties); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/20 (2008) (providing that a violation constitutes an
unfair trade practice); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2008) (authorizing damages); MD.
CODE, COM. LAW § 14-3508 (2008) (providing that a violation constitutes an unfair trade
practice); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-166 (2008) (providing that a willful, knowing, or
reckless violation constitutes an unfair trade practice); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(i) (2008)
(providing for a cause of action to those injured by a violation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-
30-07 (2007) (providing that a violation constitutes an unfair trade practice); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 359-C:21 (2008) (providing for a cause of action, authorizing treble
damages for willful violations); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-6 (2007) (civil penalties);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2008) (authorizing private cause of action); TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE § 48.203 (2007) (providing that a violation constitutes an unfair trade
practice); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.225.010(10) (2008) (authorizing private cause of
action); WIS. STAT. § 895.507(4) (2007) (indicating that failure to comply may be
evidence of negligence or a breach of a legal duty); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 603A.909, .910 (2007) (authorizing action by the data collector and providing for
restitution). Several other states authorize enforcement by a public entity without
specifically prohibiting private causes of action. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-108
(2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(4) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b(g)
(2008) (providing that a violation constitutes an unfair trade practice); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6 § 12B-104 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107 (2008); 10 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1349 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 93H § 6 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61(6) (2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(6) (2008); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 87-806 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-6 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 2435(g) (2008). Other states expressly limit enforcement to state entities. See, e.g.,
W.V. STAT. § 46-2A-104 (2008) (providing exclusive enforcement authority to the state's
Attorney General or to a financial institution's primary functional regulator, as
appropriate); see also Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data
Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 972-84 (2007) (providing a chart of state data
security breach laws).
91. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly, Inc., Assurance of Voluntary Compliance and
Discontinuance, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/lillyagreement.pdf.
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Recent bills in Congress purport to propose federal data security
protections.92 They would require entities to create programs to keep
sensitive personal information secure and to notify consumers of
suspected security breaches.93 These bills extend the trend discussed
above. On their face, the proposed bills appear to set standards that seem
to favor individuals. However, two of the bills explicitly prohibit private
causes of action for any violation of its provisions, no matter how
egregious.94 Not only may individuals not enforce the violations through
the federal act, but the majority of the bills specifically squelch the effect
of any state action relating to any act or practice governed under the
federal act.
95
Should Congress successfully enact one of these preempting bills,
however, the bill would likely be perceived as a victory for individual
data protection and personal privacy because it would provide a set of
national standards to regulate data security breaches. In fact, however, it
would roll protections back in several states where state legislatures have
passed meaningful data security statutes that allow either consumers,
state officials, or both to enforce the statutory standards.96 Such
remedies likely motivate compliance with the law in a way that will be
lost if Congress passes one of the preemptive and powerless bills.
In sum, three of the marquee pieces of federal privacy legislation
have features that pull the privacy punch that they could have delivered.
Neither HIPAA nor GLB permit those who are injured by their breach to
enforce the rights granted in the acts. This lack of private enforcement
opportunities may well, as discussed below, weaken the motivation for
those regulated to comply with their obligations. While the FCRA
authorizes some private actions, it specifically denies them for some of
the most important protections.97  The FCRA further hamstrings
individuals by creating a high barrier to punitive damages and by
92. Active bills in the 110th Congress include: the Notification of Risk to Personal
Data Act, S. 239, 1 10th Cong. (2007); the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of
2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007); the Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958,
110th Cong. (2007); and the Cyber-Security Enhancement and Consumer Data Protection
Act, H.R. 836, 110th Cong. (2007).
93. See S. 495, H.R. 958 (establishing requirements for data security); S. 239, H.R.
836 (establishing breach notification requirements).
94. See S. 239 § 9(f); S. 495 §§ 202(d), 303(d), 319(f); see also H.R. 958 § 4
(providing for enforcement only by administrative entities). But see H.R. 836 § 7(c), (e)
(providing some immunity but otherwise leaving existing state laws in place).
95. S. 239 § 10; S. 495 §§ 203, 304; H.R. 958 § 6(a), (b). But see H.R. 958 § 6(c)
(preserving state tort law).
96. See note 90, supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 32-35, supra.
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specifically preempting states from protecting individuals' privacy rights
in certain areas that could overlap the Act's coverage.
98
Furthermore, proposed legislation seeks to eliminate states from
being able to protect their citizens from breaches of the security of their
personal information, a pervasive problem for privacy that leads to
identity theft and is a consequence of modem database technology and
information sharing.
The next section describes what privacy measures-properly
enforced-can preserve, and why they are worthy of enforcement,
enforcement that states should be able to provide where federal law does
not.
B. Privacy, Personhood, and Dignity--Why Privacy Matters
Advances in technology that allow us to collect, disseminate, and
analyze myriad personal events resemble, at least on the surface, the
developments in photography and newspaper distribution that led Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis to publish their 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, "The Right to Privacy." 99 Warren and Brandeis were motivated
by the need to protect individuals not from technology, but from the
misuse of technology.' 00 To them, the invasion of privacy involved a
"spiritual" wrong, an injury to a man's "estimate of himself," and an
assault upon "his own feelings." 10 1 They described the tort as protecting
"peace of mind."'' 0 2  They proclaimed the principle of "inviolate
personality" as giving rise to the right to privacy. °3  Warren and
Brandeis were clear that meaningful remedies are part and parcel of this
right. 10 4 Nonetheless, the modem privacy legislation described above
provides remedies only spottily.1
0 5
To protect privacy is to recognize the Kantian principle of the innate
dignity of persons. 10 6  To Immanuel Kant, dignity was an intrinsic
98. See text accompanying notes 44-48, supra.
99. 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The authors, who deplored the "overstepping" of
the press and the "numerous mechanical devices" that were breaching privacy, cited the
"general right of the individual to be let alone" as the basis of the tort. Id. at 195-96, 205.
100. Id. at 195 (describing the impact of "[i]nstantaneous photographs" available to
newspapers).
101. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99, at 197.
102. Id. at 200.
103. Id. at 205.
104. See generally id.
105. See text accompanying notes 32 to 35, 59, and 80, supra.
106. See Immanuel Kant, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 54 (Lewis
White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1969) (1785); see also Maxine D. Goodman,
Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REv. 740,
751 (2006).
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quality, "a kind of value that all human beings have equally and
essentially.' ' 10 7 Dignity and privacy both take notice of the personhood
of each individual, and recognize that personhood as itself justifying
recognition by others, a respect for the individual's "inviolate
personality," freedom, and autonomy. 10 8 Dignity "can be said to refer to
the status of individuals as ends in themselves, rather than as means
toward some extraneous ends."'1 9 By according individuals dignity we
recognize that each is a "unique and irreplaceable human being."
1 0
Zygmunt Bauman put it succinctly: "[d]ignity is the humanity of the
humans."'11
If dignity recognizes the right of each individual to his or her own,
unique "inviolate personality," ' 1 2 privacy allows that personhood to
develop. 1 3 In his concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer,"14 Justice
Stewart emphasized the connections among dignity, personhood, and
privacy: "the right of a man to the protection of his own reputation...
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth
of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of
ordered liberty."' '
15
The right to privacy as described by Warren and Brandeis "posit[s]
the individual's independence, dignity and integrity; it defines man's
107. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death
Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 153
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
108. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99, at 205. See also Louis Henkin, Human
Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY
AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 107 ("[H]uman dignity requires respect for every
individual's physical and psychic integrity, for his 'personhood' before the law, [and] for
her autonomy and freedom.").
109. Herbert C. Kelman, The Conditions, Criteria, and Dialectics of Human Dignity:
a Transnational Perspective, INT'L STUDIES QUARTERLY 21, 529, 531 (1977).
110. Id. at 532.
111. Zygmunt Bauman, CHILDHOOD OF HUMAN DIGNITY, DIALOGUE AND
UNIVERSALISM 95 (2003).
112. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99, at 205.
113. See Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 378, 383 (2003). Professor Kahn observes that "[pirivacy is
valued insofar as it fosters the conditions within which an individual may establish,
maintain and develop her identity as a core aspect of personhood. Thus conceived,
invasions of privacy constitute an affront to human dignity by undermining one's
identity." Id. at 382.
114. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
115. Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court explicitly linked dignity to liberty
in Lawrence v. Texas by referring to the protection of liberty as preserving individuals'
"dignity as free persons." 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). Along these same lines, Andrew
Taslitz writes that "[t]o treat someone as a whole-as uniquely complete in himself-is
status-enhancing, expressing the idea that each human is of equal and infinite worth."
Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 49 (2003).
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essence as a unique and self-determining being."' 16 A breach of these
standards inflicts, in the words of Edward Bloustein, "a blow to human
dignity, an assault on human personality."'"17 To imperil privacy is to
diminish dignity.
So how do each of the three federal laws, and the proposed federal
personal information security legislation described above, relate to
personhood, dignity, and privacy? The FCRA exists to ensure that third
parties have a good reason to access information about individuals, and
that such information is true and accurate." 8 Should that information be
inaccurate, it would distort the person's image and portray a false version
of that person's personality to the world at large. 19 Even when accurate,
the disclosure of information outside of the permitted boundaries of the
statute can harm dignity. Such a disclosure can impair the ability of a
person to "control information about oneself and to have some limited
dominion over the way one is viewed by society.' 20  The FCRA's
boundaries also curb the tendency of those in commerce to treat
individuals, and their credit histories, as instruments to an end, a
treatment that ignores individuals' dignity.'
2'
HIPAA shows an understanding that the business of our organs,
cells, and genes is intensely personal and of great sensitivity. The
revelation of such details to others may well leave one feeling every bit
as exposed as when wearing an examining gown that gapes in the back.
We may feel most vulnerable when ailing and in need of the help of
health professionals. Vulnerability can also extend to our financial well-
being. The risk that such information may be exposed raises anxiety
over the impact it may have on others who may wield influence over that
well-being. One may fear that insurers who acquire the information
could decide that the information increases the risk of treatment too
much, whether now or in the future. The fear raises the specter of un-
reimbursed medical bills piling high, threatening the security of those
116. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964) (describing the authors' motivation for
their article as "a fear that a rampant press feeding on the stuff of private life would
destroy individual dignity and integrity and emasculate individual freedom and
independence").
117. Id. at 974.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a), (b) (2006) (describing permitted purposes for using a
credit report).
119. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 550
(2006) (describing how distortion "involves the spreading of information that affects the
way society views a person"). Professor Solove points out that though distortion hurts
the person whose image is distorted, it "has effects for all of society ... [w]e want to
avoid arbitrary and undeserved disruption of social relations." Id. at 551.
120. Id. at 550.
121. See Kant, supra note 106.
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who depend on us. By requiring those in the medical industry to obtain
consent under some circumstances before disclosing personal health
information, HIPAA acknowledges that the items of medical information
are not mere units in and of themselves, but connect to an integrated
whole, a person who is worthy of respect and care.
122
Similar to the FCRA, GLB recognizes that the information that
financial institutions have can reveal many details, from credit card
transactions to ATM use to account balances, and, when aggregated, can
reveal more of our internal thoughts than any one single item of
information could. In this age of information availability, the Act
provides that financial institutions should honor the dignity of
individuals by restraining themselves from freely releasing sensitive
information until individuals have the opportunity to opt out of the
institution's release of their data.
Finally, the proposed personal information security measures
recognize the power of personal information, the risks of identity theft,
and the damage that identity theft can do to others' perception of an
individual. By requiring that those who hold such information take
measures to protect it, 123 and acknowledging that individuals whose
information is revealed to someone unauthorized to see it are entitled to
learn of that disclosure, 124 these proposed personal information security
provisions recognize the worth of one's "inviolate personality.'
' 25
However, each of these laws permits institutions to divulge a good
deal of sensitive information. In contrast, meaningful privacy laws will
protect "against the commercial exploitation of one's personality.' 2 6 To
the extent that the federal privacy laws discussed above facilitate
trafficking in personal information by denying remedies, they risk
demeaning the dignity of individuals whose information has been
commodified, because doing so treats people as nothing more than the
particular information traded.1
27
122. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2008).
123. See, e.g., H.R. 958 § 2.
124. See, e.g., S. 239 § 2; H.R. 958 § 3.
125. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99, at 205.
126. Hill v. Hayes, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (citing N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS Law § 51).
127. See Kelman, supra note 109, at 532. The trafficking in manifestations of
personality injures personal dignity. See Bloustein, supra note 116, at 988 (describing
the injury suffered when one's name or likeness is associated with a commercial
product).
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C. Inadequate Agency Enforcement and the Impact of Rights without
Remedies on Dignity and Privacy
As discussed above, major federal privacy statutes by and large
have a dearth of private enforcement available. Restrictions on or
outright prohibition of private remedies and preemption of state laws
create barriers to enforcement, which may encourage violations.
However, conceivably vigorous public enforcement could make up for
the loss of private enforcement. Each of the privacy statutes discussed
above, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, provide for
enforcement by public officials. 128  Can such enforcement effectively
vindicate, or at least advance, the privacy rights of individuals? As
discussed below, whether aggressive administrative enforcement could
stand in for the benefits of states' tort and statutory systems is an
unanswered question, because the administrative agencies have been lax
in enforcing the standards set by Congress. This laxity may well do
damage not only to the dignity of individuals, but also to society as a
whole.
1. Problems ofAdministrative Enforcement
Each of the three federal privacy statutes designates one or more
federal agencies to enforce their provisions. For example, the Federal
Trade Commission has primary enforcement power over the FCRA,
129
the Federal Trade Commission along with the federal banking agencies
should enforce GLB,130 and the Department of Health and Human
Services should enforce HIPAA. 13' Given the amount of traffic in
personal information, administrative agencies cannot provide blanket
enforcement of the various acts' privacy protections. However, a
substantial flaw in delegating significant (in the case of the FCRA) or
sole (in the cases of HIPAA and GLB) responsibility for enforcement of
these critical privacy rights to administrative agencies is that
administrative agencies, whether for structural or political reasons, may
allow the interests of those regulated by privacy statutes to outweigh the
interests of the beneficiaries of these privacy statutes.
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801s, 6805 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 168Is(a). Other administrative agencies have FCRA enforcement
power over institutions that they regulate. Id. § 1681 s(b)(1).
130. Id. § 6805. These agencies include the National Credit Union Administration,
the Department of the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal
Reserve Board, and others. Id.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2006).
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Regardless of the substance of any given statute, agency bias in
favor of the regulated can undercut the effect of congressional allocations
of rights and responsibilities, an allocation that gives substantial power to
agencies when a statute restricts individuals' avenues for enforcement.
Arguably, agencies owe special duties to the beneficiaries of statutory
protections. 132 However, critics of agencies have asserted that agencies
tend to favor the large, organized business entities regulated by federal
statutes at the expense of less organized groups such as consumers and
environmental interests. 33  Regulated interests may well have more
access than individuals to agency decision makers, an imbalance of
representation that may lead agencies to react favorably to the
regulated. 3 4  Critics have asserted the "capture" theory, that
"administrations are systematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by
the business firms within their orbit of responsibility.' ' 135 Of course, less
malignant factors may also influence agencies, such as the lack of
institutional resources.
HIPAA, which allows no private enforcement, exemplifies the
minimal impact of federal administrative enforcement on privacy
interests. Although HIPAA relies on administrative enforcement, in that
it does not allow private causes of action, 136 the Act's enforcer, the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), has done very little
to punish violators or obtain redress for individuals whose privacy has
been lost. HHS has the power to impose $100 for each violation, up to a
maximum of $25,000.137 Under the George W. Bush administration,
consumers filed nearly 20,000 privacy grievances under HIPAA through
June 2006.138 Nonetheless, HHS has prosecuted only four cases and
132. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1813 (1975). Stewart suggests that "[p]erhaps reviewing courts
should give special weight to those interests that are likely to be 'underrepresented' in the
informal agency process and hence have a lesser impact on the agency's policy
decisions." Id. at 1787.
133. See id. at 1684-85.
134. Id. at 1713 (noting, among other benefits, that these groups can usually obtain a
forum through which to force an agency to respond to the groups' view, and have the
resources to "initiate" formal procedures).
135. Id. at 1685 (offering alternative explanations) (citations omitted).
136. See note 59, supra.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b) (2006). Criminal violations could lead to penalties of up
to $250,000 in fines and 10 years in jail. Id.
138. Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at
Al (noting that the agency under the Bush administration prosecuted only two criminal
cases and imposed no fines whatsoever, notwithstanding the nearly 20,000 privacy
grievances filed). Although the Office of Civil Rights seeks informal compliance
whenever possible, 45 C.F.R. § 160.312 (2006), informal compliance has not provided
restitution to individuals. See Kendra Gray, The Privacy Rule: Are We Being Deceived?,
11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 89, 103 (2008) (also noting that "OCR has investigated
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imposed no fines whatsoever.' 39  Rather, HHS prefers voluntary
compliance. 40 A former head of the office that enforces HIPAA has said
that staff size limited the office's ability to effectively resolve
complaints. 141
While this hands-off approach no doubt pleases those who are
regulated, privacy advocates worry that such indulgence can lead
industry participants to be sloppy when complying with the law. 142 An
industry survey revealed that only 23% of those surveyed believed that
their institutions were in full compliance with HIPAA's privacy
requirements. 43 This indicates an expansive gulf between Congress's
intent and the reality of self-regulation.
As for the FCRA, the Federal Trade Commission's catalog of its
FCRA enforcement activities on its website reveals only a short list of
actions since 2000.144 Although one of those actions led ChoicePoint
only a fraction of the complaints it has received, and of those, it has resolved the
complaint in favor of the health care provider or institution every time"); see also United
States Department for Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights, HIPAA
Compliance and Enforcement, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/enforcement (last visited
June 23, 2008) (describing complaint investigation procedures).
139. Amy Lynn Sorrell, Criminal HIPAA Case Targets Employee, Not Clinic, for
Breach, AMNews (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2008/07/14/gvsbO7l4.htm (describing the fourth prosecution); Amy Lynn Sorrell, 3rd
HIPAA Criminal Case Hints at Federal Tactics, AMNews (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/l0/16/gvsbIO16.htm. See also Stein, supra
note 138, at AI (noting only two prosecutions up until that time).
140. Stein, supra note 138, at Al (quoting Winston Wilkinson, then head of the
Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Civil Rights, which is in charge of
enforcing the law).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting one scholar as stating "I think we're dangerously close to having a
law that is essentially meaningless").
143. AMERICAN HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF
HIPAA PRIVACY AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE 3 (2005), http://www.ahima.org/marketing/
email-images/2005PrivacySecurity.pdf. See also M.L. Baker, HIPAA Compliance So-So
and Stalling, EWEEK.COM, Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care/
HIPAA-Compliance-SoSo-and-Stalling/ (describing compliance with HIPAA's
requirements as "lackluster" and stating that the number of health care providers fully
complying with the Act was falling).
144. Federal Trade Commission Privacy Initiatives Enforcement, www.ftc.gov/
privacy/privacy/index.html (last visited June 23, 2008). Published agency actions on the
site include the following: In re Milliman, Inc., No. 062-3189 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2008)
(complaint and decision and order); In re Ingenix, Inc., No. 062-3190 (FTC Sept. 17,
2007) (complaint); In re Wright-Patt Credit Union, Inc., No. C-3171 (F.T.C. Apr. 12,
2003) (agreement containing consent order to cease and desist); In re Federated
Department Stores, Inc., No. C-3175 (Apr. 1, 2003) (agreement containing consent order
to cease and desist); In re Quicken Loans Inc., No. # 9304 (F.T.C. Dec. 30, 2002)
(complaint); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, No. 00-1141 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2001) (Final
Order). Id. Other FTC actions include U.S. v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No.l:06-CV-0198
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006) (stipulated final judgment imposing $10,000,000 in civil fines
and $5,000,000 in restitution); U.S. v. Far West Credit, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-20041 (D.
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Inc., to pay a fine of $10,000,000 for violations of the FCRA and the
FTC Act, 145 the agency has not followed up with similar fines against
other FCRA violators. Studies of accuracy in credit reports, however,
reveal widespread problems. A 2004 study found that 25 percent of the
credit reports reviewed contained errors sufficiently serious to lead a
creditor to deny credit. 146  Similarly, the Consumer Federation of
America reported in 2002 that errors in consumer credit reports could
cost consumers millions of dollars in higher costs for credit. I4 7  One
consumer protection attorney testified before a congressional committee
that he has pursued hundreds of FCRA actions on behalf of consumers
successfully and that his office has more FCRA cases than can be
handled,14 8 indicating that substantially more violations occur than the
FTC can pursue. The FTC might respond that it is not its role to
vindicate every violation, but to choose those actions most likely to
promote the public interest. 149  Nonetheless, where the FCRA denies
Utah Jan. 12, 2006) (consent decree); U.S. v. AT&T Corp., No. 022-3159 (N.D. N.J.
Sept. 9, 2004) (consent decree); U.S. v. NCO Group, Inc., FTC File No., 922-3012 (C.D.
Pa. May 12, 2004) (consent decree); U.S. v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., No.l:00-CV-
0087-MHS (N.D. Ga. July 29, 2003) (joint motion for modification of consent decree);
FTC v. Citigroup, Inc., C.A., No. 01OCV-0606 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 18, 2002) (stipulation of
settlement); U.S. v. Performance Capital Mgmt., Inc., No. 9823542 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24,
2000) (consent decree); U.S. v. Trans Union LLC, No. OOC 0235 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2000)
(consent decree); U.S. v. DC Credit Servs., Inc., No. 02-5115 (D.C. Cal. June 27, 2002)
(consent decree); U.S. v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., No. 1:00-CV-0087 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 12, 2000) (consent decree).
145. See United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1-06-CV-0198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30,
2006), available at http://www.flc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf
(stipulated final judgment).
146. ALISON CASSIDY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MASSPIRG EDUCATION FUND,
MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 6, 11 (2004),
http://static.masspirg.org/reports/MistakesDoHappen2004MA.pdf [hereinafter
MISTAKES]. The study by the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group in 2004 of
154 consumers and their credit reports found that 79% of the credit reports contained
mistakes; one in four contained serious errors that could result in the denial of credit;
nearly one in three contained credit accounts listed as open that had been closed by the
consumer. Id. at 4.
147. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA AND NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING
ASSOCIATION, CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 35 (2002),
http://www.consumerfed.org/121702CFANCRA_CreditScore ReportFinal.pdf. In
2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that more study concerning the
accuracy of credit reports is needed. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
CONSUMER CREDIT: LIMITED INFORMATION EXISTS ON THE EXTENT OF CREDIT REPORT
ERRORS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS (2003).
148. LEONARD A. BENNETT, WRITTEN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES, REGARDING "FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: How IT FUNCTIONS FOR
CONSUMERS AND THE ECONOMY" 2 (2007), available at http://www.naca.net/-
assets/shared/633201869867878750.pdf. These actions would have been based on those
provisions for which the FCRA permits a private cause of action.
149. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.3 (2008) (stating, with respect to nonadjudicative procedures,
that "[t]he Commission acts only in the public interest and does not initiate an
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private remedies and preempts state protections, violators can largely be
comfortable that they are free from sanctions, leaving individuals'
privacy to their mercy.
Furthermore, Congress significantly constrained the power of the
FTC to pursue certain violations of the FCRA by furnishers. The FTC
may not impose a civil penalty on a furnisher for violating its duty to
provide only accurate information to consumer reporting agencies 5°
unless the furnisher has been previously enjoined from committing the
violation, or ordered not to commit it, and the furnisher has subsequently
violated the injunction or order. 51 Given that furnishers are free from
concerns of liability to individuals for violating this standard, 152 the leash
on administrative enforcement leaves them relatively free from concern
of incurring costs for violating this aspect of the FCRA.
None of the agencies charged with enforcing GLB's privacy
provisions took any enforcement action with respect to the Financial
Privacy Rule in the first two years of the Act. 153  The FTC took
enforcement actions against a handful of financial service providers for
violating the Act's privacy provisions over a five year span.' 54 Between
investigation or take other action when the alleged violation of law is merely a matter of
private controversy and does not tend adversely to affect the public").
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1) (2006).
151. Id. § 1681 s(a)(3). Furthermore, a court may not impose any civil penalty for any
violation of the Act occurring before the violation of the injunction or order. Id.
152. Seeid. § 1681s-2(c).
153. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
FINANCIAL PRIVACY: Too SOON TO ASSESS THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS IN THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, 7 (2000), www.gao.gov/new/items/d01617.pdf. The FTC
did successfully defend a claim by a trade association representing consumer reporting
agencies and their customers that sought to overturn GLB's regulations. See generally
Individual Reference Serv. Group v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff'd sub
noma. Trans Union v. FTC, No. 01-5202 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
154. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING
& URBAN AFFAIRS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: KEY FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS Do NOT
REQUIRE INFORMATION RESELLERS TO SAFEGUARD ALL SENSITIVE DATA 50-51, n.89,
(2006) [hereinafter GAO Report on Privacy Laws]. The actions taken by the FTC
include In re Nations Title Agency, Inc., No. C-4161, 2006 WL 1967073 (F.T.C. June
19, 2006) (complaint); In re Nationwide Mortg. Group, Inc., No. 9319, 2005 WL 996696
(F.T.C. Apr. 12, 2005) (complaint alleging violations of both the Financial Privacy Rule
and the Safeguards Rule); In re Sunbelt Lending Servs., Inc., No. C-4129, 2005 WL
120875 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2005) (complaint alleging violations of both the Financial Privacy
Rule and the Safeguards Rule); In re Sunbelt Lending Servs., Inc., No. 042-3153, 2004
WL 2682802 (F.T.C. Nov. 16, 2004) (complaint alleging violations of both the Financial
Privacy Rule and the Safeguards Rule); In re Gateway Learning Corp., No. C-4120, 2004
WL 2618647 (F.T.C. Sept. 10, 2004) (complaint). See also, FTC v. Debt Mgmt. Found.
Serv., Civ. No. 8:04-CV-EAK-MSS (M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2005).
As the cases above indicate, the FTC has put some energy into enforcing GLB's
Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 314. See, e.g., In re Nations Title Agency, Inc., No. 052-
3117 (F.T.C. June 19, 2006) (decision and order); In re Superior Mortg. Corp., No. C-
4153, 2005 WL 3524927 (F.T.C. Dec. 14, 2005) (complaint); In re Nat'l Research Ctr.
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2002 and 2005, the FDIC took only twelve formal enforcement actions
for violations of GLB,
155 and no formal FCRA actions.
1 56
Paltry agency enforcement of these federal privacy laws has a
magnified impact on privacy where tort law cannot step in to fulfill its
traditional role. As discussed below, tort law serves to deter persons
from acting in a way that violates social norms and undermines human
flourishing. Accordingly, to immunize actors from liability for illegal
conduct can remove that deterrent effect, causing them to act in such a
way as to inflict harmful behavior on others. The impact of that removal
swells when not only tort claims, but also statutory enforcement and
administrative oversight vanish. From a law and economics perspective,
"legal rules should force actors to take account of the costs of their
activities."'' 57 With minimal enforcement, public or private, these federal
privacy laws become, at most, "a hope or a wish.' 58
2. The Impact of Remediless Federal Privacy Rights.
Having a limited right to a private cause of action (in the case of the
FCRA) and no right at all (in the case of GLB and HIPAA), these federal
privacy laws may well fail to exact compliance with the standards they
purport to impose. This failure can hurt not just individuals, but society
as well.
First, the violation of these standards hurts individuals' privacy,
and, thereby, their dignity. As an example with respect to the FCRA, an
individual may deal with a merchant that falsely reports that the person
reneged on a bill, perhaps due to a clerical error in the merchant's books.
Making such a false report may well violate the Act's requirement that
for Coll. & Univ. Admissions, No. 022-3005 (F.T.C. Oct. 2, 2002); FTC v. XTEL Mktg.,
Inc., No. 04C7238e (N.D. 111. Nov. 9, 2004) (complaint).
The FTC has also taken action to enforce its rule regarding the safe disposal of
consumer credit report information, 16 C.F.R. pt. 682. See FTC News, Company Will
Pay $50,000 Penalty, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/aumort.shtm (news release
publicizing stipulated judgment and order ordering payment of $50,000 fine).
155. GAO Report on Privacy Laws, supra note 153, at 43. Since then the FDIC has
taken a few more actions, but to enforce the Safeguards Rule rather than the Financial
Privacy Rule. See generally In re USA Bank, No. 07-2-6b (Oct. 22. 2007) (order to
cease and desist pertaining to information security); In re SouthwestUSA Bank, No. 06-
216b (Nov. 9, 2006) (order to cease and desist); In re Columbia Savings Bank, No. 07-
183b (Nov. 13, 2007).
156. See GAO Report on Privacy Laws, supra note 153, at 43. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency took 18 actions between October of 2000, and September of
2005. Id. The Federal Reserve Bank, which also has FCRA enforcement authority, took
none in the first five years of this decade. Id.
157. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public
Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1019, 1032 (2001).
158. Donald H. Ziegler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 (1987).
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the furnisher take care to provide accurate information. 159 The false item
could cripple the individual's ability to obtain credit, or even to maintain
the current credit terms in place. 160 Nonetheless, the injured individual
may have no real recourse. The FCRA, while prohibiting such false
reporting, expressly denies individuals the right to sue over it.' 61 The
Federal Trade Commission could, but likely would not, seek to force the
furnisher to comply with its responsibilities. 162  State authorities could
also bring an action, but are restrained by the Act's advance notice
requirements that limit such authorities' ability to recover damages for
initial violations of some of the most important restrictions.' 63 These
authorities also suffer the same constraints on resources that federal
agencies face. 164  By limiting enforcement to administrative agencies,
budget and personnel constraints can starve these rights into obscurity.
So, with no right to enforce the statutory "right," the injured
individual could bring a defamation action under state law. However,
the FCRA anticipates that action and prohibits such use of state law
unless the injured individual can show that the furnisher acted with
actual malice or willful intent to injure. 165 Other state remedies would
likely be foreclosed by the Act's preemption provisions. 166 The injury to
reputation, to privacy, and to dignity will go untreated, and the offender
can remain free from compensation concerns that could encourage it to
modify its business practices to mind the dignity of the individual lives it
touches. 
67
The consequences of a failure to enforce HIPAA are similar. Here,
the federal statute has not preempted state remedies, at least those that
are not less favorable than HIPAA's privacy provision.168  However,
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) (2006).
160. See generally Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data
Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061 (2007)
(describing the kinds of impacts that negative information in a credit report can have on a
consumer).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c).
162. Id. § 168 Is. The FTC would be unlikely to pursue a case that impacted only one
individual.
163. Id. § 1681s(c)(5).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 171, 210-16.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). The immunity would arise if the disclosure arose from
one of the provisions specified. Id.
166. See id. § 1681t(b)(l)(F). The preemption provision preserves two preexisting
state statutes, one from California and one from Massachusetts. Id. § 1681t(b)(1)(F)(1),
(ii).
167. The individual could pursue correction of the item through the Act's requirement
that agencies, once notified of an inaccurate item, must try to verify it with the item's
furnisher. See id. § 168 1i.
168. Pub. L. 104-191, § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-2 (2000)).
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HIPAA's main flaw is that its denial of a private cause of action stretches
much more broadly than does the FCRA's selective denial, which leaves
some rights open for private enforcement. 169 HIPAA creates some rights
to maintain the privacy of medical information, but fails to back them up
with any meaningful recourse for redress. The danger of this practice is
that regulated entities-hospitals, doctors, and other participants in the
medical industry-may be aware of the standards and yet be complacent
about complying with them, given the lack of rigor that the Department
of Health and Human Services' Office of Civil Rights has shown in
enforcing the Act's privacy provisions. 170 At the same time, however,
the publicizing of the privacy rights may give individuals a false sense of
security, causing them to drop their guard and disclose sensitive
information they may have kept private had they realized the Act's
absence of teeth. Accordingly, individuals may end up losing privacy
instead of gaining it.
Similarly, news of the privacy provisions of GLB does not usually
carry with it the warning that they are rights in name only. 7 ' To the
extent people even understand that they have the ability to opt out of the
sharing of their private financial information,' 72 they may not understand
that institutions may well suffer no consequences whatsoever for
violating GLB's restrictions on information disclosure.
The lack of private enforceability of the standards set by federal
personal privacy statutes may have loosened privacy protection,
notwithstanding Congress's pronouncement of specific standards of
behavior. For example, evidence indicates that even GLB's weak
privacy protections, intended in part to curb profligate sharing of
personal information among financial institutions, are widely ignored.
73
The Act does not provide individuals the tools with which to learn
whether institutions are revealing private information, and so individuals
have a difficult time learning whether the Act has been violated and by
whom. Widespread sharing of personal information without notice may
occur, invisible to the individual whose information is on display. So
169. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681e, 1681i; see also id. §§ 1681n, 1681o (the
private cause of action provisions of the FCRA).
170. See text accompanying notes 136 to 143, supra.
171. See, e.g., Don Oldenburg, Protecting Your Financial Privacy, WASH. POST, July
27, 200 1, at C12.
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1); 16 C.F.R. § 313.10(a)(1) (2008). Privacy notices
issued under GLB have been criticized for their readability. Mark Hochhauser, Lost in
the Fine Print: Readability of Financial Privacy Act Notices (July, 2001), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm.
173. See James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making
Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 1,43 (2005).
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long as the regulatory agencies do not police day-to-day compliance, that
compliance becomes, as James Nehf has written, "largely voluntary."'
' 74
Actions that corporations may take without much fear of
consequences include the disclosure of account information to third
parties, information that might reveal what an individual buys, when, and
for how much. If companies do not abide by their obligation to notify
consumers of institutional privacy policies,175 an individual may never
learn that his or her personal information can be widely disseminated.
Although federal law guarantees to individuals the right to opt out of
many disclosures of personal information, if a company violates the
statutory obligation to allow each individual an opportunity to opt out,
that individual is powerless to restrain the institution's disclosure, sale, or
other use of the information.176 By providing a standard and then failing
to enforce it, federal law comes close to inviting the very behavior that it
appears to prohibit.
Without private remedies, the federal acts lose all the benefits of the
private attorney general, the deterrence and standard-defining effects that
arise from litigation brought by those who are harmed by the violations.
In the case of privacy, that means that we are losing an opportunity to
help further define the types of behaviors that breach the norms Congress
intended to govern.
Given the evidence thus far, we can anticipate the effects of a
federal personal information security law, as described above, if that law
has no private enforcement remedies and preempts the many state laws
that have arisen that require those with sensitive data to notify
individuals when they have lost control of that data. 177 Were certain bills
to pass that are currently pending in Congress, no one whose data was
treated carelessly, in a way that would violate both a state law and the
proposed federal law, would have any ability to enforce it.'78 Rather,
only federal agencies and state attorneys general would have the power
to enforce the standards. 79 Since administrative enforcement of other
federal privacy statutes has been so loose, we could anticipate that very
few actions, if any, would be brought against those who flouted the new
law, no matter how egregious the infractions. Those injured by the
breach would naturally turn to state personal information security laws,
174. Id. at l.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a).
176. See id. § 6802(b)(1); 16 C.F.R. § 313.1(a)(1).
177. See statutes cited at note 90, supra.
178. See S. 239, 110th Cong. § 10 (Jan. 10, 2007); S. 495, 110th Cong. §§ 202(d),
303(d), 319(f) (Feb. 6, 2007); H.R. 958, 110th Cong. §§ 4, 6 (Feb. 8, 2007). Butsee H.R.
836, 110th Cong. § § 7(c), (e) (providing some immunity but otherwise leaving existing
state laws in place).
179. See S. 239 §§ 8, 9; S. 495 §§ 202, 203, 303, 304, 317, 318, 303(d).
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only to find that Congress has struck them down with its power to
preempt. Nonetheless, publicity surrounding such a federal law would
likely not highlight the lack of power to enforce it and, thus, individuals
might well be deceived into thinking that congressional action had
actually enhanced, rather than reduced, the security of personal
information held by institutions. Such false security might well lead
individuals to take less rather than more care with their personal
information.
Altogether, these federal privacy rights portray an image of national
protection, of restraining the technological advances that can reveal so
much so quickly. Yet, without remedies and without meaningful
enforcement, the standards run the danger of becoming mere
suggestions. Regulated institutions may perceive no recognizable
downside to breaching these standards, where revealing credit histories,
financial transaction information, and details of health records may all be
traded and sold.
The loss is not for individuals alone, but for individuals collectively,
that is, for society. We may become deceived, being careless with our
information because we believe that de jure limitations will be de facto
limitations. This false sense that legal standards are observed may lead
individuals to treat their personal information with less care, or with less
discretion. We may think of the privacy laws as a group that collectively
shields us, but we do not realize the barrier is illusionary.
II. THE TRADITION OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES-FEDERALISM AND
ENFORCEMENT
A. The Tradition of State Torts
The federalization of privacy rights veers from a long tradition that
vests the responsibility for citizens' well-being in the states and their
torts. The tort system exists to force wrongdoers to account for
"damages inflicted or injuries caused, whether by malfeasance,
misfeasance, or nonfeasance."'1 80 Though civil tort actions developed
from criminal actions, and became distinct from those actions, torts
continued to provide a punitive function to address those who breach
acceptable social norms.1 8' That these norms develop in the hearth of the
local community is reflected in the legal standards that we still use;
180. Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega
SocialPolicy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 511,527 (2001).
181. Id. at 519-20.
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negligence, for example, is judged in the eye of a normal member of the
community.
82
States make moral choices through their development of tort law,
selecting "the essential needs and requirements of mankind."' 83 Through
torts, the justice system encourages a culture of care, 84 one that fosters
the capacity for individuals to develop a tailored version of the
Aristotelian "good life.' ' 185 Thus, tort law deters conduct that the state
has determined undermines human flourishing.'
86
The Supreme Court has emphasized that states have "a significant
interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State.', 187 The
Court has acknowledged the special role of state common law torts and
the interests of the state in protecting its citizens by upholding the rights
of such citizens to employ state common law torts even where Congress
has usurped the underlying area for regulation. For example, in Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 188 the administrator of the estate of a laboratory
analyst, who had worked at a federally-licensed nuclear facility, brought
suit pursuant to Oklahoma common law after the analyst became
contaminated from plutonium at the facility.'89 The defendant argued
182. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Lecture IV: Fraud, Malice, and Intent-The Theory of
Torts, in THE COMMON LAW 130, 162 (1881) (arguing that the standard should be
"whether his conduct would have been wrong in the fair average member of the
community, whom he is expected to equal at his peril").
183. Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law
Constitutionalism, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 440 (2003) (discussing the role of the
common law and constitutions in promoting the public good).
184. Nelson P. Miller, Seven Conceptual and Historical Errors in Tort Law, 40 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 59, 68 (2004) ("[T]ort law is a guidepost to a better life-for both
the careless actor and the potential recipient of the careless action.").
185. See generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (Cambridge rev'd ed. 2001) chs. 8-12; see
also LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1969) ("The morality of aspiration is most
plainly exemplified in Greek Philosophy[;] [i]t is the Good Life, of excellence, of the
fullest realization of human powers.").
186. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the
Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1058
(2003); see also Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816,
825 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the two principal purposes of tort law are "the
deterrence of misconduct and the provision of just compensation to victims of
wrongdoing"); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982)
(describing the "underlying objectives of tort liability [to be] to compensate the victims
of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdoing"); Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp.,
Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 615 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that "deterrence of negligent conduct" is
"one of the primary functions of the tort system"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 90 1(c) (1979) (citing deterrence of wrongful conduct as one purpose of tort actions).
187. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984).
188. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
189. Id. at 242-43.
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that the Price-Anderson Act, a federal act that regulated the safety of the
nuclear energy industry, overrode any right of the plaintiff to seek
remedies from state common law.' 90 However, the Court rejected that
argument, upholding the plaintiffs right to seek the punitive damages
that state law authorized.
In addition to deterring harmful conduct that impedes human
flourishing, state tort law can adapt and evolve because it has an organic
quality that responds to its environment. State tort law also has the
ability to attend to the particular details of a given situation, and in that
way to acknowledge the complexity of human life and human
interactions. 191 Tort law allows states to develop diverse policies that
suit the needs of their particular citizens by recognizing and honoring
states' interests in allowing their citizens to enforce local norms. 192 In
addition, it allows states to flexibly accommodate the shifting needs of
their citizens by adapting old torts or even by creating new ones. 193 The
common law, by changing shape with each new decision, can "embody
the fundamental values of a society" as those values shift over time and
respond to developments in technology, industry, and moral reasoning. 94
It has a record of adapting over centuries to societies' needs as they
evolve: "It is the peculiar merit of the common law that its principles are
so flexible and expansive as to comprehend any new wrong that may be
developed by the inexhaustible resources of human depravity."' 195 An
190. Id. at 256. "It may be that the award of damages based on the state law of
negligence or strict liability is regulatory in the sense that a nuclear plant will be
threatened with damages liability if it does not conform to state standards, but that
regulatory consequence was something that Congress was quite willing to accept." Id. In
contrast, where the regulated area is "'a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,"' a federal regulation may be much more likely to preempt a state tort action.
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
191. See THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A
PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW xXiii (1906).
192. For example, states have developed different standards of care regarding the
liability for escaped water. See Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and
National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 514 (2002) (describing such choices
as being based on the particular economic needs of each state). The article describes a
number of other areas in which states have developed different standards. Id. at n.209.
193. Id. at 514-15.
194. See Poole, supra note 183, at 445 (quoting T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 19 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001)).
195. Johnson v. Girdwood, 58 N.Y. St. Rep. 338 (1894). Thomas Atkins Street
lauded the "complexity" of the common law as reflecting the complexity of human life
and human intercourse. "The common law is really the very embodiment of the spirit of
law. The dominance of this spirit is conspicuously shown in its wonderful tenderness for
facts and its singular patience in working out details. A genius for searching out external
truth is the peculiar mark and the peculiar strength of the English common law." STREET,
supra note 191, at xxiii.
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early torts scholar described the common law as "an organism which is
almost purely of natural growth."'
196
Not only does tort law allow states to adapt to the needs of society
and its citizens by adapting the use of old traditional torts, but it also can
expand with new torts to respond to those needs. Justice Brandeis
observed that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country."'
197
Privacy torts, which were gradually adopted after Warren and
Brandeis's groundbreaking article,' 98 exemplify just that sort of response.
Invasion of privacy actually comprises four different torts: appropriation,
false light in the public eye, unreasonable intrusion, and public disclosure
of private facts. 199 These torts are described in more detail below. Torts
that can protect values similar to those advanced by the privacy torts
include defamation, breach of confidentiality, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.200  The flexibility of tort law is revealed by the
ways states have picked and chosen among these available actions.
Nearly every state recognizes at least one form of the tort, some through
statute rather than by common law;20 1 however, states may recognize one
without recognizing another. For example, Minnesota has declined to
recognize the false light tort, while adopting the other three privacy
torts. 2  New York has chosen not to treat privacy as a common law tort
subject, and instead addressed the injury through state statute.20 3
Recent evidence of this plasticity of tort law is found in the
developing field of cyberspace law. Michael Rustad and Thomas
Koenig, privacy scholars, have emphasized the importance of torts in
196. STREET, supra note 191, at xxiii. Street later noted that "[a] fact which is to-day
recognized as parasitic will, forrsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent basis
of liability. It is merely a question of social, economic, and industrial needs as those
needs are reflected in the organic law." Id. at 470.
197. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 n.13 (1985) (all noting the value of the federalist
structure); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting
in part).
198. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 99.
199. See generally Keeton, supra note 76, at 849-69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1979).
200. See Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing the
duty of a member of the clergy to keep parishioner's information confidential); Doe v.
Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (recognizing a similar duty for a
psychoanalyst to a patient); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46, 558.
201. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2008).
202. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 1998).
203. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2008).
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balancing the interests of industry participants and individuals: "Tort
rights and remedies must be strengthened so that they can play their
traditional social control role in the information age; an era in which the
nature of injuries has been transformed from tangible, physical harms to
intangible injuries to privacy, reputation and individual dignity. 20 4 Tort
law's ability to adapt to changing technology and norms gives it a
powerful advantage over the federal privacy enactments discussed above.
In sum, through a system of torts, localities can promote the
individuality of their citizens and foster the inquiry for the "good life,"
can adapt to changes in the social norms that govern individuals'
relations with one another, and can create new torts that reflect changes
in personal development, in technology, and in society. Discussed below
are some of the features of state privacy laws.
B. State Privacy Protection
1. State Privacy Protection through Common Law Torts
Invasion of privacy comprises a quartet of torts developed at
common law that protect individuals from privacy breaches and
information disclosures. Appropriation involves the use, for the
defendant's benefit, of the plaintiffs name or likeness. 20 5 False light in
the public eye allows an action for publicity that places a person in a
false light where that publicity is highly offensive to the ordinary person,
even if the publicity is not defamatory.20 6  Unreasonable intrusion into
seclusion allows a cause of action for the intentional interference with a
person, or that person's private affairs.207 Public disclosure of private
204. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 6 (2002).
The authors go on to trace tort history, arguing that through the Industrial Revolution tort
immunities granted to negligent actors, such as contributory negligence and the English
fellow servant rule, bred "corporate irresponsibility." Id. at 28-29.
205. See Keeton, supra note 76, at 851; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C
(1979); see also Sloan v. S.C. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 586 S.E.2d 108, 110 (S.C. 2003)
(because state law authorized sale of images on drivers' licenses, no liability for
misappropriation).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. The First Amendment strictly limits
awards under this tort when the information concerns public figures or matters of public
interest. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (applying New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to hold no recovery for false light for publication of
fictionalized version of plaintiffs' hostage experience, portrayed as re-enactment, without
showing actual malice).
207. Keeton, supra note 76, at 854; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
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facts prohibits the disclosure of private facts to the public when such
disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.2°8
These torts in their original forms protect privacy imperfectly. For
example, the tort of public disclosure of private facts, as construed before
the advent of widespread use of technology, required proof that publicity
was given to matters concerning the plaintiff's private life, that
publication of those matters would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities, and that the matter publicized was not of
legitimate public concern. 20 9 The publicity element can be difficult to
satisfy for those who have suffered from a humiliating disclosure to only
one or a few. Nevertheless, the adaptability of the common law appears
in the decision of a court in Wisconsin, which adjusted this element in
just the sort of manner typical of the evolution of common law torts. The
Wisconsin court upheld an invasion of privacy verdict based on a single
disclosure to a single person, stating that the jury may consider the type
and character of the person to whom the defendant disclosed the
information in determining whether the plaintiff satisfied the publicity
element of the tort.2"0 In a similar example of growth, some courts have
ruled that if the persons to whom the defendant discloses the private
matter have a special relationship with the plaintiff, disclosure to just a
couple of people may satisfy the disclosure element. 211 These examples
of adaptation offer models for courts that face claims involving changes
208. Keeton, supra note 76, at 856-57; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
209. See, e.g., Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 371-72 (8th Cir. 2002); Johnson v.
Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law), rev'd, 47 F.3d 716 (5th Cir.
1995) (en banc), vacated and remanded after remand, 120 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1997);
Robins v. Conseco Fin. Loan Co., 656 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
210. Pachowitz v. Ledoux, 666 N.W.2d 88 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). Similarly, a federal
appeals court upheld a jury's verdict that a single disclosure of a love letter and a wife's
diary to the wife's husband could yield liability for public disclosure of private facts
under Kentucky law. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
211. See Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 925, 941 (N.D. I11. 1998)
(disclosure of plaintiff's affair with a married man to two of her potential business clients
could satisfy publicity element; however, plaintiff failed to show that the information was
private and that its disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, therefore
action dismissed). See also Hill v. MCI WorldCom Comm'ns, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d
1205, 1212-13 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (telecommunications carrier's disclosure to customer's
ex-husband of customer's billing information and names of parties she'd called stated
claim because of special relationship between customer and ex-husband); Munoz v.
Chicago School Reform Bd. of Bd. of Trustees, No. 99 C 4723, 2000 WL 152138, at *10
(N.D. II1. Feb. 4, 2000) (teacher who alleged that her personnel file was disclosed to
students' parents met publicity element because she had a special relationship with those
parents); Pinkston-Adams v. Nike, Inc., No. 99 C 1044, 1999 WL 543202, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 22, 1999) (communication of personal information to plaintiffs employees could
meet publicity element); Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (I11. Ct. App.
1990) (plaintiff could meet publicity element of tort based on employer's disclosure of
her surgery to her co-workers because of her special relationship with them).
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in information technology, such as that allowing mass aggregation and
analysis of disparate bits of data. Such a court could similarly reinterpret
a privacy tort element in a way that would permit privacy interests to
advance in a manner that federal laws have thus far failed to do.
The tort of intrusion also applies to the disclosure of personal
212information. The tort creates liability for the intentional intrusion
upon another person's solitude, seclusion, or private affairs in a manner
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.213 The intrusion
need not be physical; but can give rise to liability for the unauthorized
214 215prying into a bank account or unwarranted access to a credit report.
212. See, e.g., Rodgers v. McCullough, 296 F. Supp. 2d 895, 904 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)
(alleging tort where the opposing attorney in a custody dispute used the plaintiffs credit
report without a permissible purpose, acknowledging that Tennessee recognized the tort
but ruling that a fact issue existed as to whether the use would have been highly offensive
to a reasonable person). Not every state recognizes the tort of intrusion, however. See,
e.g., Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812 (1998) (declining to decide
whether tort of invasion of seclusion exists in North Dakota).
213. See Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 372 (8th Cir. 2002); Olwell v. Med. Info.
Bureau, No. Civ. 01-1481 JRTFLN, 2003 WL 79035, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2003);
Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre Cos., L.L.C., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exchange,687 A.2d 1375, 1380, 1381 (1997); Irvine v. Akron Beacon
Journal, 770 N.E.2d 1105, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (affirming jury's award of
$100,000 in punitive damages for defendant's repeated computer-dialed sales calls to
plaintiffs home); see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (2003);
Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (1989) (declining to decide
whether tort recognized in Illinois); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233
(Minn. 1998); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 84 (Tex. App.
1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
214. See, e.g., Lowe v. Surpas Resource Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1239 (D. Kan.
2003) (deciding that it is for the jury to decide whether debt collector's actions intruded
upon borrower's seclusion); Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 882 F. Supp. 836, 867 (S.D. Iowa
1994) (affirming verdict that defendant had intruded upon the seclusion of plaintiff, who
was defendant's employee, by accessing his credit card records to check his activities on
days he had called in sick; rejecting defense that defendant had a legitimate objective in
reviewing the records), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 72 F.3d 648 (8th Cir.
1995); Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1008-09 (reasoning that people have a reasonable
expectation that someone to whom they disclose their social security numbers will keep
the numbers private, and therefore the wrongful disclosure of the number may be
considered sufficiently offensive to support an action based on intrusion upon seclusion;
however, people do not have a similar expectation of privacy as to their work addresses,
and therefore no intrusion upon seclusion action can be based on the release of that
information); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Pa. Super. 1998) (concluding
that the defendants' acquisition of the plaintiffs' financial information could fulfill the
intrusion tort). But see Phillips, 312 F.3d at 372 (future mother-in-law's improper
purpose to obtain credit report on plaintiff did not render acquisition "highly offensive"
for purposes of intrusion upon seclusion invasion of privacy tort); In re Trans Union
Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 343-42 (N.D. Il1. 2002) (consumer reporting
agency's disclosure of plaintiffs' credit reports to target marketing firms did not meet
highly offensive element of intrusion upon seclusion invasion of privacy claim); Fabio v.
Credit Bureau of Hutchison, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 688, 693-94 (D. Minn. 2002) (debt
collector's use of curse words in telephone demands for payment did not render intrusion
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Thus, the common law of torts offers a number of avenues to pursue
those who breach privacy. However the torts, interpreted in a cramped
and faded way, may insufficiently protect individuals from modem
privacy invasions. Nonetheless, courts may continue to develop the torts
to respond to the increased use of personal information in our society.
Because of state torts' capacity for adaptation, federal statutes should
minimize their interference in the evolution of those torts. HIPAA,
which designates a floor of protection privacy but allows states to create
standards even more protective of privacy, offers a model for minimal
federal statutory intrusion on privacy protection by the states.
2 16
2. State Protection of Privacy through Enacted Laws
State governments, similar to the federal government, have
responded to modem threats to privacy with legislative action, and these
statutes are much more likely than federal statutes to provide injured
citizens with remedies. Just as the federal government has enacted the
FCRA, HIPAA, and GLB, all to cope with the increasing availability and
power of personal information, several state governments have similarly
enacted legislation designed to target specific areas of privacy threats.
For example, a variety of states have enacted state credit reporting
statutes to supplement the FCRA, statutes that provide for private
217enforcement. As identity theft incidents have risen, states have
enacted a number of statutes designed to deter identity theft and to help
highly offensive); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884 (S.D. Ga.
1983) (under Georgia law, tort requires physical invasion akin to trespass).
215. Smith v. Bob Smith Chevrolet, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 808, 822 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2) (2006).
217. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1691 to 44-1697 (2008); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1785.1-1787.3 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-14.3-101 to 12-14.3-109 (2008); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 55-701 to 55-722 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3571.1-3571.2
(2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1311-1329; MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW §§ 14-
1201-1218 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, §§ 50-68 (2008); MINN. STAT.
§§ 13C.001-13C.04; 72A.496-72A.505 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-101 to 31-3-
153 (2007) (expressly providing that a civil action for defamation, invasion of privacy or
negligence is available against agencies that do not comply); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 598C.010 to 598C.200 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:l to 359-B:21 (2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:11-28 to 56:11-41 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3-1 to 56-3-8
(2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 380 to 380-t (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3904.01
to 3904.22 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 81-86, 147-148 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-
13.1-20 to 6-13.1-27 (2007); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 391.001 TO 391.002, 392.001 to
392.404 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-7-107 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2480a-
2480g (2008); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.182.005 to 19.182.902 (2008).
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victims remediate the damage of theft.218 That so many states have done
so reveals the interest states have in protecting their citizens from this
technology-assisted crime. The theft of an individual's identity co-opts
that person's image for use wholly outside his or her control and thereby
reaches to the heart of individual personhood and dignity, damage that
states have a strong interest in preventing. However, the FCRA
explicitly preempts state laws in many areas that have recently drawn
219state legislatures' attention. With respect to identity theft, the FCRA
preempts states from enacting requirements for fraud alerts in consumer
220 2reports, '° the blocking of information resulting from identity theft,22'
and the verification by credit card issuers of the identity of an applicant
whose credit file has been contaminated by identity theft.222
Accordingly, state statutes that seek to curb the dignity-destroying effect
that identity theft has on victims' credit histories may well be rendered
useless by the FCRA's preemption provisions.223
States have similarly adopted legislation to provide remedies for the
sorts of privacy invasions envisioned by GLB, involving the use of
nonpublic personal information by financial institutions. Following the
passage of the Act, a number of states enacted their own financial
information privacy acts.224 As discussed above, Congress did not equip
GLB with its own private enforcement mechanism, and courts have held
that injured consumers do not have the right to enforce the Act
themselves. 221 In adopting statutes similar to the federal act, however,
many states explicitly provided that individuals whose information was
disclosed or misused could in fact bring a suit to recover for the violation
in civil court.226
218. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Identity Theft State Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edul
microsites/idtheft/reference-desk/laws.html (listing the state identity theft laws by
category).
219. See text accompanying notes 44 to 48, supra.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(B).
221. Id. § 1681t(b)(5)(C).
222. Id. § 1681t(b)(5)(B).
223. Id. § 1681t(b)(5)(B), (C). For instance, several states have developed security
alert provisions similar to that of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1785.11.1 (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2VV (West 2008); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3568(C) (2008). Several states have also enacted provisions similar to
that of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2, requiring consumer reporting agencies to block false credit
history information that arises from identity theft. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-200
(2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-699f (2008).
224. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 85.
225. See, supra note 81.
226. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:3A-503 (2008) (designating violation of state
insurance information privacy act an unfair or deceptive trade act or practice); ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 530/20 (West 2008) (designating violation of state Personal Information
Protection Act an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
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States have also been much more willing to put teeth into their
health information statutes. For example, several states permit a private
cause of action for the disclosure of genetic information without the
owner's consent, 227 a disclosure that HIPAA prohibits without providing
any remedy.
22 8
Finally, as discussed above, states have shown initiative in creating
legislation to guard against the damage caused when the security of
computerized personal information is breached.229 By doing so, states
have brought Justice Brandeis's words to life, becoming "laborator[ies]"
for new legislation that addresses new risks brought on by technology.
230
Even in the absence of legislation, state attorneys general have pursued
lax data security practices pursuant to state consumer fraud statutes.231
All of these actions evince the interests states have in protecting their
citizens' privacy by developing remedies for new wrongs, whether
through evolution of the common law or by statutory enactment.
Practices Act); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 500.501-500.547 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60A.982 (West 2008) (designating violation an unfair trade practice); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-923 (2008) (designating violation an unfair trade practice); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
39-105 (2008) (providing remedy); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 746.680 (West 2008)
(providing limited remedies, including equitable relief, for the wrongful use or disclosure
of insurance information); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-119 (2008) (specifically creating a
private cause of action for the violation of the federal GLB pursuant to the state unfair or
deceptive act or practice provision).
But see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-1334 (2008) (prohibiting violations of GLB, but
expressly providing that no private cause of action was created); IND. CODE § 27-2-20-4
(2008) (expressly providing that enactment did not create a private right of action); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-02-27 (2008) (expressly providing that nothing in the state's
provision prohibiting violations of GLB will be construed to create a private cause of
action); OKLA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 307.2 (West 2008) (same).
227. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.13.010-100 (2008) (permitting a private cause of
action for actual damages along with statutory damages of either $5000 or $100,000
(§ 18.13.020)); CAL. INS. CODE § 10149.1 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 629.101-629.201 (West 2008).
228. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2008). This assumes that the genetic information would
constitute protected health information. Id. § 160.103. See also Valentin Munoz v.
Island Fin. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136 (D.P.R. 2005); Johnson v. Parker Hughes
Clinics, No. Civ.04-4130 PAM!RLE, 2005 WL 102968, at *2 (D. Minn. 2005); Univ. of
Colo. Hosp. v. Denver Publ'g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1144-45 (D. Colo. 2004);
Logan v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, No. 02-701 (RJL), 2004 WL 3168183, at *4 (D.D.C.
July 28, 2004); Northwestern Memorial Hosp. v. Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 2002); O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (D. Wyo. 2001).
229. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 90.
230. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
231. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly, Inc., Assurance of Voluntary Compliance and
Discontinuance, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/lillyagreement.pdf.
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C. Federal Laws and the Tradition of Private Attorneys General
As discussed above, the trend in federal privacy statutes has been to
undercut the interests of individuals in protecting privacy rights. Not
only does this approach diverge from that taken by states, it contrasts
sharply with those federal statutes that permit enforcement through
"private attorneys general." Such parties can vindicate statutory policies,
efficiently enforce congressional standards, deter socially harmful
behavior, and offset any capture of governmental regulators by regulated
parties. First used by Justice Jerome Frank in Associated Industries v.
Ickes,232 the term "private attorney general" refers to anyone who brings
a proceeding to vindicate the public interest. Such a person can be a
"powerful engine of public policy. '233 Private causes of action help to
enforce a variety of federal statutes, including antitrust, environment,
securities fraud, consumer protection, and other federal legislation
enacted to coerce private parties into acting for the benefit of the good,
rather than for personal profit.234
Allowing private attorneys general to bring claims in court serves a
highly efficient economic purpose of "addressing corporate misconduct
without requiring a rigid government bureaucracy. '235 Private suits can
boost public enforcement, which is often constrained by limited funds,
without burdening the taxpayers. 36  Where a federal law promotes
important social norms or private incentives, enlisting private individuals
to enforce those norms can achieve the same impact that, at the
governmental level, could require many bureaucrats and much
funding.237
In addition, and of great significance to privacy, where deterrence
means much because privacy lost cannot be regained, the use of private
attorneys general can deter actors from violating the set standards.
Private litigation may obtain compensation for those injured by a
violation of the statute, but may also deter law-breaking behavior by
supplementing public enforcement efforts, thereby "multiplying the total
resources committed to the detection and prosecution of the prohibited
232. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
233. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 (1998).
234. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1284 (1976).
235. Rustad, supra note 180, at 520.
236. See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment,
103 MICH. L. REv. 589, 608 (2005).
237. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the
First Amendment, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1803, 1831 (1999).
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behavior.' ,238  An actor who knows that interested private eyes, in
addition to weary and overworked (and possibly uninterested) public
ones, are supervising its acts, may find the risk of being caught
sufficiently high to encourage the choice to conform to the legal
standard.
Recognizing the benefits that a private enforcement provision can
provide to the public, many states have incorporated them into their
consumer protection and other, similar public interest statutes. States
recognize that public enforcement alone may fail to fully motivate those
regulated to comply with the statutory standard.2 39  For example,
California's consumer protection statute has particularly broad remedial
provisions, operating to "effectuate the full deterrent force" of that
240statute. Private suits to enforce these statutory rights can in this way
affect industry behavior far beyond the righting of the immediate
plaintiff s wrong.24'
Despite these benefits, the collected federal privacy laws discussed
above have in common that they discourage, if not outright eliminate, a
role for private attorneys general. By refusing to allow private citizens to
enforce all the rights conferred on them, Congress lost opportunities to
give life to the policies embodied within those statutes.242 In contrast, a
private cause of action can help implement a two-pronged enforcement
scheme, thereby providing a backup in the case of impotent agency
243action.
Not only can private parties who have enforcement power
supplement public enforcement efforts, but private parties also can
enforce the social norms embodied in federal statutes when government
238. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218, 221-23 (1983)
(noting concern that the mechanism of private attorneys general has been abused,
notwithstanding the deterrent function, and empirical evidence that too many private
actions have simply "piggyback[ed] onto public enforcement efforts").
239. See Morrison, supra note 236, at 605-06 (noting that many state environmental
and consumer protection laws provide for citizen suits).
240. Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 57 (Cal. 1979).
241. See Morrison, supra note 236, at 607 ("Legislatures, in short, have often
commissioned private plaintiffs in the pursuit of the public interest.").
242. Rustad, supra note 180, at 529 (citing Chayes, supra note 234).
243. As the Supreme Court has said in the context of qui tam actions:
[Olne of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on
the Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private
persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or
the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the
ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public
vessel.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943) (quoting United States
v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)).
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regulators and legislators are unwilling to confront large industry players
despite the damage they may be doing to individuals.2 44 As noted by
proponents of private attorneys general, they help to ensure that
enforcement of statutory norms is "not wholly dependent on the current
attitudes of public enforcers, 2 45 an effect also known as "capture. 24 6
Where a public regulatory agency has a monopoly on enforcement, there
is a high risk that those the agency is charged with regulating may have
far more influence over the agency than those the agency is charged with
protecting.24 7 That is, "the agency might become unduly influenced by
the entities it regulates. 24 8 That the Department of Health and Human
Services has been reluctant to exact penalties for the violations of
HIPAA's privacy provisions does not indicate the absence of such
249
influence by those who are to abide by the act's protections.
Without a private right of enforcement, private attorneys general
cannot serve the functions of enforcing standards, deterring misconduct,
and supplementing governmental enforcement. The statutes may well
result in de facto immunity for reprobate industry members who profit
and thrive on invading the privacy of individuals. Depending on federal
agencies to enforce the rights of private citizens is costly and depends too
much on those agencies being willing to confront potentially powerful
businesses that can exert pressure to minimize the ultimate effects of
such actions. By denying injured individuals any right to enforce their
privacy interests, Congress loses an opportunity to "permit ordinary
citizens to change corporate practices," a major purpose of the social
policy of torts. °
III. A RETURN TO STATE ENFORCEMENT
To be meaningful, to alter behavior, and to promote asserted values,
rights require remedies.2 5' Without remedies, only the good wishes of
244. See Rustad, supra note 180, at 520.
245. Coffee, supra note 238, at 227.
246. See Morrison, supra note 236, at 609.
247. Id. See also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (collecting literature on agency
capture); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1713 (1975) ("It has become widely accepted, not only by public
interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the
process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.")
(citations omitted).
248. Morrison, supra note 236, at 609.
249. See text accompanying notes 136 to 141, supra.
250. Rustad, supra note 180, at 527.
251. See text accompanying notes 159 to 179, supra.
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the regulated will motivate them to comply with statutory demands,252
and where compliance would cut into profits or inhibit competitive goals,
such good wishes will not suffice. As privacy rights have moved from
state to federal dominion, remedies have been lost. Congress has
adopted standards but has crippled the ability of individuals hurt by the
breach of those standards to recover for the breach. While Congress
empowered federal and state agencies with enforcement, these agencies
have not embraced their responsibility to pursue violators. A variety of
reasons may account for this-insufficient personnel and resources, lack
of institutional will, and political pressure are leading candidates.
Regardless of the reasons, federal privacy laws as implemented have left
consumers more, not less, vulnerable, and have given more, not less,
power to the entities that have access to individuals' personal data.
Given the impotency of these federal laws, we should construe
narrowly whatever power they may have to supplant state privacy laws.
In addition to helping individuals obtain redress for violated rights, such
constraint would also fulfill a signaling function to alert states that their
efforts to address the injuries that can arise with the abuse of new
technology would not be for naught. This would encourage state
legislatures and courts to fulfill the opportunity to "experiment" in their
laws, and to evolve to adjust to changing circumstances as tort law
traditionally has.253 In responding to such a signal, states may adapt old
torts to the changing threats to privacy or initiate new torts."'
Alternatively, states can bypass the common law entirely and provide
relief through legislation.
Allowing states to participate in protecting privacy would provide
the benefit of multiple levels of government, where "if one fails to act,
another can step in to solve the problem., 255 This would allow states to
develop their own laws "in accordance with justice and humanity. 256
252. See Ziegler, supra note 158, at 678.
253. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
254. See Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort
Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 475, 514 (2002) (offering examples of significant new
torts that states have created to address new circumstances, including the tort of invasion
of privacy). The author also notes that those situations, such as in the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, see text accompanying notes 42 to 48, supra, where the congressional
legislation has voided state common law remedies without substituting a corresponding
federal remedy, invokes high state interest that justifies greater scrutiny of the preemption
provision. Id. at 536.
255. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empower States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption,
33 PEPP. L. REv. 69, 74 (2005).
256. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 411 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)
(noting differences among court decisions on the fellow servant rule that allowed
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As discussed above, however, the trend in federal privacy law has
been to minimize potential remedies. Congress does this by failing to
provide for a private cause of action, by limiting the monetary value of
available remedies, and by preempting states from enacting legislation
that could protect privacy.
A. State Tort Law
Privacy standards have a natural home in tort. As discussed above,
torts, especially at common law, provide a number of societal benefits.
Among these benefits is deterrence. Ideally, the risk of uncertain
damages, and especially punitive damages, deters those who would
otherwise ascertain advantages from engaging in the discouraged
behavior. The deterrent effect is most valuable for privacy invasions.
Once digitalized and released, information can be copied, emailed,
aggregated, and archived-a genie that cannot be rebottled.
In addition, enforcement of standards through the judicial process
helps to interpret and define those standards, which notifies the benefited
of what they can expect from the restricted, and notifies the restricted of
how they should constrain their behavior in order to avoid liability.
Aside from the notice function, the judicial process can also incorporate
changes in technology and in societal norms by responding to individual
sets of circumstances.
To the extent that a federal statute supplants state laws, such
deterrence, notice, and adaptation benefits are lost, unless enforcement at
the federal level mimics what would have been achieved at the state
level. Where remedies are minimized or removed entirely, however, the
federal law becomes not much more than a "hope or a wish. 257
The standards held hostage by federal privacy laws should be
enforceable by the states because people value the types of privacy that
the laws purport to protect.258 Social norms are reflected in Congress's
own statements and actions.259  They are echoed in statements by
agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services' that
declared that medical privacy is a "fundamental right" different from
corporations to be exempt from liability for the negligence of employees where that
negligence injured another employee).
257. Ziegler, supra note 158, at 678.
258. See RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 227-29
(1989) (discussing types of information that people want to shield).
259. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 103 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1865, 1868 (noting the purpose of HIPAA).
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"ordinary economic good[s],, 260 and described "the inherent meaning of
privacy: it speaks to our individual and collective freedom.",
261
To protect privacy is to recognize the fundamental dignity of
individuals, that each has a unique personality that the individual can
develop and express only within a zone of privacy. To immunize actors
from consequences for any violation of privacy, to deprive those injured
of any sort of remedy for that violation, risks undermining the very
attributes that the tort of privacy law is designed to protect-dignity and
personality. Common law privacy torts recognize the value of human
dignity by encouraging the circumstances "necessary for individuation-
the realization of one's distinctive identity as a unique human being. 262
Such torts can help protect the integrity of individual identity, "man's
spiritual nature. 263
Enhancing enforcement of privacy standards can confer societal
benefits in addition to individual ones. Avishai Margalit describes a
civilized society as one whose members do not humiliate one another,
and a decent society as one in which institutions do not humiliate
people. 264 A healthy respect for privacy can help move a society to
become both civilized and decent. Given the withdrawal of remedies at
the federal level, states should step in to promote individual dignity by
protecting privacy.
B. State Enacted Legislation
State-enacted laws can also add meaning to the privacy standards
set by Congress. In tort law, states have historically led the way in
developing causes of action to accommodate society's changes.
2 65
Sometimes, the federal government has, through a statute, established
new standards that states have then used to follow up with their own
legislation, especially for consumers. For example, Congress amended
the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938 to specifically prohibit
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices.' '266 However, the Federal Trade
Commission Act did not create a private cause of action, but merely
260. Preamble to the Privacy Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,464-65 (Dec. 28, 2000).
261. Id.
262. Kahn, supra note 113, at 404 (2003). Professor Kahn recognizes that the
relationship of personhood, dignity, and privacy is complex, and describes it as follows:
"[w]hereas dignity broadly implicates a consideration of the inherent value of human
beings, privacy involves the more focused right to protect the conditions necessary to
individuation. That is, where dignity broadly conceived is a condition of personhood,
privacy is an attribute of individuality." Id. at 378.
263. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 99, at 193.
264. Avishai Margalit, THE DECENT SOCIETY 201-22 (1996).
265. See supra notes 180 to 204 and accompanying text.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006).
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empowered the Federal Trade Commission to seek relief.267 To fill the
void, states enacted their own consumer protection legislation, and now
every state except Iowa encourages consumers to supplement the efforts
of public actors, or state agencies, to enforce the law by permitting
individuals to bring suits themselves. 68 In many cases these new statutes
essentially supplant the traditional common law action for fraud. 269 An
advantage of common law fraud is that it offers the opportunity for
punitive damages. 270 Many states sought to retain that benefit by adding
their own punitive or treble damages provisions,271 a feature that has
been described as essential to their mission.272 Through enhanced
remedial provisions these state statutes can deter harmful behavior,
realizing the norms that the statutes value.
273The personal information security statutes, discussed above, are a
fresh example of the sorts of initiatives that state legislatures can take,
with all of the alacrity missing at the federal level. Rather than seeking
to preempt such legislation with a toothless substitute, the federal
government should recognize the benefits to individuals' privacy and
well-being that such measures can provide.
Privacy, in particular, may be better suited to state law because of
the difficulty in reaching agreement on what privacy is. Willis Ware has
argued that for purposes of policy making, we should stop trying to agree
on what privacy is and instead develop a consensus on what an
"invasion" of privacy is.274 Without interference from the federal
government of the sort described above, states would be free to
267. See generally Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(discussing history of the FTC Act and the reasons why a private remedy should not be
recognized).
268. See National Consumer Law Center, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES § 7.2.1 (6th ed. 2006).
269. But see id. § 9.6.3 (identifying advantages of common law deceit and other tort
actions over statutory deceptive practices act actions).
270. Id.
271. Ten states have deceptive practices statutes that authorize punitive damages
directly. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1780 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-11 OG (2008); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28-3905(K)(1)(C) (LexisNexis 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399 (2008); IDAHO
CODE § 48-608 (2008); Ky. REV. STAT. § 367.220 (2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.025
(2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 464.638 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2 (2008); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2461 (2008). Many more authorize treble damages.
272. Steven W. Bender, Oregon Consumer Protection: Outfitting Private Attorneys
Generalfor the Lean Years Ahead, 73 OR. L. REV. 639, 671-72 (1994).
273. See supra notes 229 to 231 and accompanying text.
274. Willis A. Ware, A Taxonomy for Privacy, in REPORT ON THE NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON PERSONAL PRIVACY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 16 (1981); see
James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 43 (2005) (arguing that using such an approach "tracks and reflects usage of evolving
technologies as society adapts to new intrusions and adjusts the boundaries of acceptable
conduct, rather than a priori prescribing those boundaries").
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experiment with standards that reflect a more protective attitude toward
personal information. They could, for example, model many European
nations that reject the presumption that personal information should be
freely available for commercial exploitation. 75
CONCLUSION
Federal privacy statutes engage in a game of deception. They
purport to solidify norms for the privacy of our personal information,
whether financial, medical, or other. They make demands of those who
have control over individual information. However, they often fail to
offer real remedies when those demands are not met, and sometimes
even invalidate state measures meant to protect privacy. As a
consequence, while those whom the federal laws purport to protect may
falsely perceive that the disclosure of their private data will be punished,
the regulated receive comfort that they can breach privacy with impunity.
This trend of toothlessness in federal privacy law began with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, which allows some, but not complete, private
remedies, and has continued through the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Most recently, the
trend appears in bills offered to protect the security of personal
information data that also prohibit private remedies otherwise existent in
state laws and furthermore preempt those state laws.
While federal laws offer some hope by allocating the responsibility
for enforcement to agencies and states, limiting enforcement to
governmental agencies may be little better than eliminating enforcement
entirely. Such agencies have shown insufficient appetite for taking
powerful institutions to task. In effect, agencies depend on regulated
institutions to police themselves, but too much profit can be had from the
abuse of privacy to count on the good will of those that have power over
personal information.
Federal laws undercut the potential for redress by limiting private
causes of action, and by sometimes simultaneously preempting state
protections. However, given the importance of privacy norms and the
tradition of rights and remedies for privacy at the state level, states
should seek to push their capacity to use laws, whether common or
enacted, to protect their citizens to the very limits they can. The dearth
of federal remedies contradicts a long tradition of rights and remedies,
and is at fundamental odds with the policy of law serving to crystallize
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and promote social norms. Although other federal laws protecting
individuals have encouraged such promotion by allowing private
attorneys general, federal privacy laws have broken with this tradition
where they have sought to eliminate any private remedy.
Enforcement of social privacy norms, as embodied in laws state or
federal, is necessary to meaningfully protect personality and dignity.
States can resume their traditional roles as protectors of their citizens by
responding to increased threats to privacy. They can do this by adapting
common law torts or by enacting legislation; where these instruments
provide enforcement through private causes of action, those protected by
the instruments can vindicate their rights. More importantly, such
remedies can deter violations to begin with, the ultimate aim of any
privacy provision.

